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                                              Abstract 
Growing Apart: Ghana’s Growing Regional Inequality since the Adoption of Poverty 
Reduction Strategies and the HIPC Initiative (2000 – 2013)                 
                                               
                                 By   Kojo Anane Ampofo 
 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy programmes were officially launched in 1999 and 
became the key component of many development programmes. Their aim was to address 
the high rates of poverty prevalent in many developing economies. They also promised to 
address regional inequalities within countries by reducing regional differences in poverty 
levels.  
This thesis presents an analysis of Ghana’s PRSP from 2000 to 2013 and the associated 
enhanced HIPC initiative. It argues that a problem caused by the programme’s neoliberal 
approach as well as its implementation has failed to reduce disparity between Ghana’s 
wealthier South and poorer North. The analysis is based on three main sets of data: 
regional distribution of the HIPC grant; regional composition of private sector 
development and export policies pursued under the PRSPs. The thesis demonstrates 
growing levels of poverty in the North when compared to the South due to the differences 
in economic structures between the two regions as the South was able to benefit from 
policies favouring export orientation and support for the formal private sector, while the 
North could not. This was aggravated by the inequitable distribution of the HIPC grants 
between the two regions.    
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Chapter One - INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
 The need to tackle growing differences in poverty levels between geographical 
units within countries has become an important topic in international development in 
recent years. This need is evidenced in the new global development goals, the Sustainable 
Development Goal 10 (SDG 10), which places emphasis on reducing all forms of 
inequality including spatial inequality. Indeed, major research projects such as Spatial 
Dimensions of Human Development by Kanbur and Venables (2005) have concluded that 
spatial inequality in many developing countries is high and continuously rising (p22). 
Similarly, the 2009 World Development Report (WDR) on Equity and Development also 
highlights the widening of spatial inequalities in many developing countries. However, 
this phenomenon of growing differences in poverty levels between geographic units 
within developing countries has continued to occur and even increased since the 
introduction of poverty reduction as the focus of international development policies. The 
enhanced HIPC initiative and PRSPs introduced around 1999, which were all placed in 
the poverty reduction framework, required that poor countries showed plans and 
strategies that would be used to reduce national poverty. Hence, targeting excluded 
regions and marginalised communities within countries with relatively high poverty 
levels in order to redress uneven regional development by default was an expected 





countries’ PRSPs across the developing world (sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Southeast and Central Asia) by Higgins et al. (2010) shows that the 
problem of regional inequality was recognised in those PRSPs (p 5). In Ghana, reducing 
regional inequalities was a central theme of the country’s PRSPs. The Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy I (GPRS I) stated emphatically as a main goal to accelerate poverty 
reduction in the three most deprived regions in northern Ghana in order to address the 
regional inequality that exists between the country’s North and South(GoG, 2003 p. 31). 
However, there is less evidence of achieving this goal as there is a growing disparity 
between the North and South.  
Since the implementation of the Ghana’s PRSP, the country has made giant strides 
in reducing poverty from 51.6 percent in 1992 to 24.8 percent in 2013(UNDP, 2013, P 
35). As a matter of fact, Ghana is even touted as the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to 
achieve the MDG 1 which is halving income poverty in 2006, even ahead of the 2015 
timeline (GoG and UNDP, 2012, p. 13). However, despite this achievement, there are 
substantial regional and spatial differences within the country that are masked by this 
‘average’ dominant-poverty reduction story claimed by the government of Ghana and 
donor agencies. Ghana’s poverty reduction is not as widespread as one might have hoped; 
its pattern is limited to only some parts of the country.  
The success story of poverty reduction is concentrated in the capital city, Accra 
and the forest zone (all in the South) where majority of Ghana’s  resources such as cocoa, 
gold, and timber are produced (Whitfield, 2009, p. 9). Many other parts of the country 





regions of the country,  have  experienced  lesser improvement in poverty reduction (ibid,  
p. 10).The savannah regions of Ghana (i.e. the Northern, Upper East and Upper West) 
have  benefited very little from the country’s poverty reduction . While the absolute 
number of the poor declined by some 2.5 million people from 1991 to 2006 in the South, 
it increased by 0.9 million people in the savannah regions by this same period (Abdulai 
and Hulme, 2014, p. 3). In addition, the rural areas of these regions make the largest 
contribution to national poverty with the Upper West Region, Upper East Region and 
Northern Region contributing to 92.6 percent, 87.3 percent, and 80.8 percent respectively 
(UNDP, 2013, p. 10). Other measures of poverty, which take into account the distance 
separating the poor from the poverty line, that is, the poverty gap, which shows the 
severity of poverty has significantly increased in the savannah regions of the country over 
the years of the PRSP implementation from 36.6 percent in 1998/99 to 49.3 percent in 
2005/06 (GSS, 2007 ).    
Similarly, other welfare indicators which are used to measure poverty in Ghana 
also show that poverty gap between the northern and southern parts of the country to be 
profound. Non- income based poverty measurements such as access to basic services such 
as to education and healthcare facilities, literacy, adequate toilet facility, electricity 
among other social services do not only show the North-South  divide, but also the 
limited progress in poverty reduction in these areas since the implementation of the 
PRSPs and enhanced HIPC initiative  (UNDP, 2013). This growing pattern of poverty in 
the northern regions of the country suggests that recent development policies were unable 





did at all, then the changes were very slow or not fast enough to avoid a widening gap 
between the northern and the southern regions of the country. On the basis of this 
growing disparity between Ghana’s North and South since the implementation of the 
country’s Poverty Reduction Strategies and HIPC initiative, it has become imperative that 
we analyse these programmes in the country to find out how they impact on the country’s 
regional inequality. Nonetheless, it is important to state that even though we consider the 
design and implementation of the country’s PRSPs and HIPC to be the major reason 
behind the country’s increased regional inequalities in recent times, we also admit that 
other factors like migration and the conflict that resulted from the Yendi chieftancy 
dispute in the North could have also contributed to the inequalities.   
The concerns about rising spatial inequality or inequality across geographical 
units within a country have been at the centre stage of recent development discussions for 
some major reasons.  First, from a normative perspective, inequalities such as a high 
degree of regional inequality may be regarded as unjust or inequitable. Secondly, regional 
inequality has adverse implications for poverty reduction and beyond this, it can also 
constrain overall national development in ways such as providing grounds for national 
conflict. According to Ayeertey et al. (2009), regional inequality can also produce severe 
consequences such as discontent, conflict and even war, especially if it coincides with 
divisions along socioeconomic lines such as migrants and natives, different ethnicities, 
different religions, among other socio-economic divisions (p3). Thirdly, regional 
inequality is also an issue of social justice. People want to live in societies that are fair 





location. Lastly, the trend towards growing regional inequalities has occurred mainly 
within the context of positive economic growth and poverty reduction which undermines 
the rapid achievement of the MDGs (UNDP, 2005). All these reasons emphasise the need 
for governments and development agencies to actively seek policies that will ensure 
harmonious development in a country. 
Research Question  
In view of the unequal progress achieved in reducing poverty in Ghana, under the 
country’s Poverty Reduction Strategies and the enhanced HIPC initiative from 2000 to 
2013, the objective of this research is to investigate how these programmes have impacted 
the unequal progress in reducing poverty between Ghana’s northern regions and southern 
regions. In order to achieve this objective, this thesis will analyse the possible underlying 
weaknesses of the PRSPs and the HIPC initiative, both in terms of their design and 
implementation by examining the different debates on the effectiveness of these 
programmes in reducing spatial differences in poverty.  
On this basis, the principal question this thesis sets out to ask is how Ghana’s 
PRSPs and HIPC initiative impacted  the country’s  increased  North –South inequality 
from  2000 to 2013. This question becomes even more important to ask, especially when 
Ghana’s Poverty Reduction Strategies and the HIPC initiative were supposed address the 
country’s North-South inequality by reducing the differences in poverty levels between 







It is my argument that a limited approach to poverty taken in the PRSPs and the 
neoliberal design of the programme as well as inequitable distribution of HIPC resources 
have led to increased disparity in poverty levels between northern and southern Ghana.                     
In this sense, this section mainly reviews the variety of debates on the PRSPs and 
the HIPC initiative, in an effort to identify their effectiveness in addressing spatial 
dimensions of poverty within developing countries. However, we will begin by first, 
reviewing the various literature on the meaning of poverty in order to shed light on the 
multidimensional nature of poverty and why the Poverty Reduction Programmes 
introduced in the 2000s take a limited approach to poverty. We will also discuss how 
neoliberal policies have featured in the Poverty Reduction Programmes and reveal why 
the IFIs embarked on poverty reduction as an approach to development. We will then 
proceed to discuss how Poverty Reduction Programmes (ie PRSPs and their associated 
HIPC initiative) have impacted regional inequality through either reducing or increasing 
regional differences in poverty incidence within developing countries. 
 
What is Poverty? 
 The concept of poverty has acquired an important focus in development policies 
in the last four decades or so, but determining who are the poor is a difficult task. Poverty 
is considered multidimensional in nature and a dynamic construct whose causes are 
complex. As a result, a range of definitions exist to define poverty are influenced by 





practitioners as to how to define and measure poverty is still ongoing. This thesis neither 
seeks to discuss all the definitions of poverty nor which definition is most appropriate. It 
is nonetheless crucial to understand some of the major definitions and approaches which 
have been used in determining or describing who is considered as poor for the purpose of 
this thesis, which emphasises that the Poverty Reduction Programmes introduced around 
1999 take a limited approach to poverty. On this basis, a brief overview of some 
definitions and categorizations used in describing poverty will be given in this section. 
 
 
Economic well-being  
Since World War II, economists have used the dominant Western definition to 
describe poverty in monetary terms, using levels of income or consumption to measure 
poverty (Grusky and Kanbur, 2006, p. 11). This definition measures poverty in terms of 
economic well-being. According to Hallensleben (2012), this approach is based on the 
idea that there are basic means of survival and thus, poverty would mean being deprived 
of these minimum requirements (p11). Not surprisingly, there are disagreements about 
what is important for survival and whether or how certain non-materialistic human needs 
that are social, psychological or political in nature should be considered given that they 
cannot be appointed a monetary value. Although this critique makes a salient point, there 
are some justifications for focusing on poverty as material deprivation. Morduch (2006) 
argues that this approach is practical because “inadequate income is clear, measurable, 





income has a strong correlation with other important concerns that are difficult to 
measure. To support this claim, he argues that those who are most vulnerable to health 
issues and with the lowest social status tend to come from the bottom of the income 
distribution (ibid 29).  
This approach is often used in developing countries to define poverty through the 
establishment of a poverty line, which is calculated as the amount of income required to 
acquire a minimum food calorie intake or a minimum basket of consumption goods 
needed to live a basic life (Stiglitz, 2012, p 11). A person is considered poor if his/her 
income or expenditure is below this cut-off line.  However, according to Morduch(2006),   
using household income alone to assess whether one is poor or not may not be enough. 
This is because households also borrow, sell assets or draw on savings when their income 
is low (p. 30). Due to this, consumption expenditure is more stable than income and so 
many experts consider it to be a better indicator of poverty. Streeten (1998) also points 
out that: 
using consumption expenditure has the added practical advantage of often being 
more easily gathered than income data, which can be quite uncertain for owner-
operated farms or firms for which no books are kept and for which the concept of 
net profits is vague (p. 42). 
So too, does the consumption-based measure capture what agricultural households 
consume as they produce large portions of their consumption themselves, which is not 





With the consumption-based approach, a person who is unable to acquire the 
consumption basket of basic goods is considered poor and an individual who cannot even 
acquire the minimum calorie intake is considered extremely poor. This approach is used 
by the World Bank in defining the extreme and general poverty lines for developing 
countries as $1.25 and $2.50 per day respectively in dollars adjusted for purchasing 
power parity (PPP) (Kanbur & Lustig, 2001, p. 23).  The government of Ghana also 
follows the World Bank in using the consumption expenditure to measure poverty. It sets 
the extreme poverty line at GH¢792.05 per adult equivalent per year, the money needed 
to meet basic nutritional requirements even if one devoted his or her entire consumption 
budget to food, and the general poverty line at GH¢1,314, which is the amount of money 
needed to fulfill one’s basic food and non-food needs ((GSS, 2014, P 11).  
The use of an international poverty line, such as one used by the World Bank, 
allows us to measure global progress. However, national poverty lines are more 
appropriate for analyses and comparisons within a country since eating and living patterns 
vary from country to country. Thus, the measurement of poverty based on poverty lines 
enables analysts to describe a situation and to monitor changes against a clear benchmark 
(Morduch, 2006, p 31). Nonetheless, it is worthy to note that there is a difference between 
the poverty line concept and reality. This is because the living conditions between people 
just below the poverty line and others who are slightly above it will not be easily 
noticeable although the former would be considered poor while the latter would not. 
Despite the advantages of the economic well-being approach, it simply reduces poverty to 





includes a variety of social issues such as vulnerability, insecurity, isolation, exclusion 




Poverty as lack of capabilities  
For some time now, development scholars have argued that the concept of poverty 
is broader than economic welfare, which is too narrow to reflect individual well-being, 
and have called for the inclusion of other dimensions, such as health and education. Sen 
(1987, 1999) is one of the chief advocates of taking a broader approach to development 
and poverty.  According to Sen (1999), development involves the increase of individual 
freedoms, which is reflected in the ability to freely choose between “alternative 
functioning combinations” (p. 75). This approach focuses on the capabilities that enable 
people to choose the lifestyles they themselves value and also convert their resources to 
achieve desirable needs.  From this perspective, poverty is understood as a lack of these 
capabilities, which undermines the rights of the poor to determine their access to 
resources, their opportunities to convert these resources to promote their ends, and the 
possibilities to participate in relevant social processes (Hallensleben, 2012, p. 7).   
Contrary to the economic well-being approach, the capabilities approach rejects 
the idea that having enough income or opulence in itself guarantees improved living 
conditions. Advocates of the capability approach argue that what matters more is how 





2014, p. 123; Clark, 2005). To buttress this argument, Sen (1999) cites the example “that 
a person who is disabled may have a larger basket of primary goods and yet have a less 
chance to lead a normal life than an able-bodied person with smaller basket of primary 
goods” (p 74).  This is to illustrate that an individual’s well being should not  be  based 
only on the primary goods he/she holds , but also the relevant personal characteristics that 
govern  the conversion  of primary goods into the individual’s ability to promote his or 
her needs.   However, with the capability approach, it is argued that no fixed list of 
capabilities needs to be developed to accommodate individual and social heterogeneity, 
diverse values, such as equality, social justice, and human rights (Clark, 2005). This 
flexibility of the capability approach, however, serves as a double-edged sword. There is 
no consensus on the list of basic capabilities that can be applied universally across various 
contexts (e.g., across different countries or regions). Since there is no generally accepted 
list of capability sets, the capability approach is often criticized for its limited 
applicability and usefulness.  
Inspired by Sen’s capabilities approach is the United Nations’ Human 
Development Index (HDI), which adds the dimensions of health and education to that of 
income to determine a country’s level of development. This metric system enhances the 
comparison of poverty from a multidimensional perspective and therefore to some extent 
the applicability of the capabilities approaches.  The HDI ranges from 0 to 1 and the more 
developed a country is, the closer its HDI will approach the value 1. In the 2014 HDI 
ranking, Norway had the highest with 0.944 and Niger the lowest at 0.348. Ghana was 
ranked 140
th





Similar to the HDI is the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) which is also 
used in the assessment of poverty in recent times.  According to Alkire and Foster (2011), 
the MPI, which takes a more multidimensional approach to poverty, is regarded as 
capability deprivation (480). Like the HDI, the MPI is also based on the same three 
dimensions of poverty. In order to determine who is poor and who is not, Bourguignon 
and Chakravarty (2003) contend that “a multidimensional approach to poverty defines 
poverty as a shortfall from a threshold on each dimension of an individual’s well-being” 
(P 25). This approach also involves the notion of poverty lines, whereby the individuals 
below a poverty line are identified as poor. The margin of poverty is set at the point when  
an individual is  suffering deprivation in  33% or more of the indicators ( mostly related 
to the Millennium Development Goals)  used in measuring the three dimensions of 
poverty – health, education  and standard of living ( UNDP, 2015)  .  
In a nutshell, the capability poverty approach incorporates individual factors into 
poverty definition and measurement but by doing so it might actually neglect the 
important roles social orders and relationships play. These institutional mechanisms are 
equally important since they can create obstacles or offer opportunities in transforming 
capability into human well-being.   
 
Social exclusion  
Another major dimension of poverty definition and measurement is social 
exclusion. According to this approach, someone “with adequate income and adequate 





excluded from the mainstream economic, political, and civic and cultural activities that 
are embedded in the very notion of human wellbeing” ( Wagle, 2002, p. 162). Social 
exclusion affects poverty in many different ways. According to Verba et al. (1993)  any 
form of discrimination be it explicit or implicit on race, gender or location can have an 
economical impact by denying some individuals access to some activities, such as 
entering the formal economy  (p 312).  Similarly, preventing people from engaging in 
social activities such civic associations, membership organizations, social networks, 
among others have negative impacts on well-being because social belonging plays an 
important role in increasing social capital. For instance, Haan and Maxwell (1998) 
demonstrate how associations such as farmers’ cooperatives have been used in addressing 
poverty issues among smallholder farmers (p. 5). In assessing these concepts of poverty, 
Wagle (2002) argues that “while all three approaches – economic well-being, capability, 
and social exclusion - are relevant to define, measure, and explain poverty, their 
meaningful integration is yet to take place” (p 162). 
In spite of the different approaches used in the conceptualization of poverty, over 
the last few decades, poverty has been increasingly viewed as multidimensional and as 
such not easily defined. It is more than a lack of income or consumption; it includes a 
variety of social issues such as vulnerability, insecurity, isolation, exclusion and lack of 
power.  The World Bank (1999) utilized inductive approach to uncover the dimensions of 
poverty. In the studies, the Bank recognized an even broader conceptualization of 





powerlessness, feelings of vulnerability and prior risk exposure, and the subjective 
experiences of ill-being and well-being (World Bank, 1999, p.20).  
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) also differentiates   between five dimensions of 
poverty: (i) the economic dimension, which identifies poverty as insufficient income to 
meet basic needs; (ii) the human dimension, which focuses directly on accessibility to 
basic needs such as education, health and nutrition, without making specific reference to 
income; (iii) the political dimension, which  refers to deprivation of basic political and 
human rights as well as limited influence on public policy making; (iv) the socio-cultural 
dimension, which indicates social exclusion and a lack of dignity within or between 
communities; (V) the protective dimension, which implies vulnerability to social, 
economic or security related shocks (OECD, 2001; Yankson, 2005, p. 8).These attempts 
made at defining poverty  from different perspectives as captured above  indicate that  
poverty  never results from the lack of  one thing  but from many interlocking factors that 
make it a difficult concept to define. Aboyade (1987) in buttressing the difficulties in 
trying to arrive at a common and generally accepted definition of poverty argues that 
there seems to be a general acceptance of the fact that poverty is a difficult concept to 
handle, and that it is more easily recognized than defined. The complex nature of poverty 
has made it not easy to find a universal definition for it and that, even attempts made by 
some development organisations to categorize some specific areas that the definition of 





for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guideline on Poverty Reduction 
(2000) stresses that:  
 An adequate concept of poverty should include all the most important areas in 
which people of either gender are deprived and perceived as incapacitated in 
different societies and local context. It should encompass the causal links between 
the core dimensions of poverty and the central importance of gender and 
environmentally sustainable development (p.29).  
This argument from OECD only limits poverty to the following five dimensions: 
economic, human, political, socio-cultural and protective capabilities. However, copious 
accounts from the poor themselves across the globe show that the definition of poverty 
and it causes vary by age, culture, gender, region and social and economic context 
(Narayan et al 2000: 29-30). Thus, limiting poverty to certain core dimensions cannot be 
said to be universal. For instance, in Ghana both rural and urban, men associate poverty 
with a lack of material assets, while for women, poverty is defined as food insecurity 
(World Bank, 1999, p 27). In the same country, the notion of poverty differs by age.  
Younger men consider the ability to generate an income as the most important asset, 
while older men cite as most important the status connected to a traditional agricultural 
lifestyle. Similarly, in Madagascar the notion of the causes of poverty depends on one’s 
status and location.  For instance, farmers in rural areas link poverty to unfavourable 
weather; the poor in the city to rising prices and fewer employment opportunities while 
the affluent in the city associate poverty  to deterioration in domestic and international 





Adopting categorization as the standard for defining poverty creates  even more 
disagreements as to what actually  constitutes poverty at different stages  of the society, 
be it the individual, household, community or the nation as a whole. Often times, what 
constitutes the definition of poverty and the measurement indicators of poverty applied in 
one type of society may not necessarily be transferable to other societies.  The OECD 
(2000) states that dimensions and measures of poverty may be inconsistent, which 
complicates the task of identifying the poor (p. 33). In support of the argument that the 
pattern and shape of poverty varies by social group, location, and country, a study by the 
World Bank on poverty using participatory approach has shown that the poor also 
experience and understand their poverty in terms of a range of non material and intangible 
qualities such as insecurity, lack of dignity and status or a lack of power or opportunity 
which distinctively differs among communities (World Bank 1999, p 10).  
Theoretically, poverty may also be defined in two different ways: poverty in the 
absolute sense, and poverty in the relative sense. The more optimistic definition uses an 
absolute concept of poverty; if a person falls short of a certain minimum standard of 
living, he/she is considered poor, and once such person passes this standard, he or she is 
no longer poor. For instance,  the United Nations in monetary terms uses 1.25$  as the 
poverty line for measuring poverty in developing countries and that if a person lives on 
less than  the said amount in a day, he/she is considered poor . Aliyu (2003) explained 
absolute poverty to be  “the condition where an individual or group of people are unable 
to satisfy their basic requirements for human survival in terms of education, health, 





of absolute poverty, Aboyade (1987) defined it as “the insufficient or total lack of 
necessities and facilities like food, housing, medical care, education, social and 
environmental service, consumer goods, recreational opportunities, neighbourhood 
amenities and transport facilities”(p. 7).  However, what is considered as the poverty level 
may differ greatly from country to country and may even differ between social strata 
within a country. This therefore means that poverty can exist in relative terms. Relative 
Poverty can be described as “a situation where an individual can be said to have access to 
his/her basic needs, but is comparatively poor among persons or the generality of the 
community” (Aliyu, 2003, p. 2). Affirming the above definition of relative poverty, 
Baumol and Blinder (1998) described the poor as those who fall too far behind the 
average income of the community they live in (p, 45).   
Regardless of how poverty is defined or categorised, for many decades it has been 
done by those who have never been affected by it.  Agreeing with Chambers and Conway 
(1992), the architects of these poverty policies (planners) apply top-down schemes to 
elicit data that fit into preset boxes. These concepts and measurements usually fail to 
capture the complex and diverse realities of poverty hence the failure of many 
intervention programmes.  
 
Jeffrey Sachs and the Poverty Reduction Agenda  
 
As noted in the above section, poverty has been defined and described in various 
ways by several organisations and individuals. One of these individuals whose 
conceptualisation of poverty has had profound influence on development programmes in 





Our Time and his role as the Special Adviser on the Millennium Development Goals to 
then Secretary General of the UN, Mr. Kofi Annan.  
As concerned as Sachs appears to be about the world’s poor he makes a proposal 
for ensuring development and overcoming poverty in poor countries particularly in 
Africa. Sachs argues that “all parts of the world have the chance to join an age of 
unprecedented prosperity building on global science, technology, and markets” (Sachs, 
2005, p2) to promote economic development.  However, he explains that the success of 
the market as an engine of  development is based on certain preconditions, which are the 
availability of basic infrastructure (roads, power, and ports) and human capital (health and 
education).  Without those preconditions, markets can cruelly bypass large parts of the 
world, leaving them impoverished and suffering without respite.  
Hence, to ensure that the market brings about economic development, Sachs 
argues that countries should focus on key public investments such as the provision of 
health, education, infrastructure, and be supported by foreign assistance when needed 
while they desist from inward-looking development strategies that are based on heavy 
state involvement (ibid, p 3). Thus, in essence, Sachs argues that economic growth by the 
market is an important instrument in ensuring development but poverty can be an 
impediment. He further argues that when poverty is very extreme, the poor become 
trapped and do not have the ability by themselves to get out of it. This is because when 
the people are utterly destitute, all their energies go into survival and there is no capacity 
to save and accumulate the “capital per person” needed to lift themselves out of poverty 





projects in order to place the poor on the “bottom rung of the ladder of development” 
from which they can help move themselves upwards (Ibid p 244).   
At the international level, Sachs argues that in order to ensure economic 
development in the poorest countries there is the need to help these countries gain a 
foothold on the ladder. Rich countries do not have to invest enough in the poorest 
countries to make them rich; they need to invest enough so that these countries can get 
their foot on the ladder. After that, the tremendous dynamism of self-sustaining economic 
growth can take hold (ibid p73). Thus, according to Sachs, development can be 
interpreted as economic growth by the market which he believes will co-exist with a 
reduction in poverty.    
On this basis, Sachs makes a proposal for overcoming poverty which serves as an 
impediment to development in poor countries, particularly in Africa, and first begins by 
identifying the causes of poverty in developing countries. Sachs rightfully argues that the 
long-held notion that corruption and poor governance are mainly responsible for poverty 
in the global South is one based on wrong analysis, but he disappointingly outlines factors 
which are equally contentious to be responsible for poverty in Africa; some of these 
factors are malaria, AIDS, Africa’s few navigable rivers, worsening droughts, and lack of 
infrastructure (Ibid, 188-209). He continues by proposing that the international 
development community can overcome poverty by using a “differential diagnosis’’ to 
identify “basic needs”, which are listed in the  UN Millennium Project report  that he 
chaired. These include primary education for all children, with designated target ratios of 





anti-malarial bed nets for all households in regions of malaria transmission; access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation; one-half kilometre of paved road for every one thousand 
people; access to modern cooking fuels and improved cooking stoves to decrease indoor 
air pollution (Sachs, 2005, p. 292-293). Despite the report being framed in the discourse 
of human development, it retained commitment to Washington Consensus fundamentals 
concerning free trade, export-led development, and macroeconomic stability. 
Sachs’ proposal for poverty reduction, which was basically neoliberal in nature, 
became very important for the survival of neoliberalism in the late 1990s when it had 
become apparent that the SAPs, which introduced neoliberal policies in Africa, had failed 
and brought hardships to African countries (Bond and Dor, 2003). His proposal, which 
was a neoliberal project, but framed in a poverty reduction discourse became the bottom 
line of development theory and gained resonance with the international development 
community. The proposal was incorporated in many international development policies 
and programmes in the 2000s, including the PRSP and its associated HIPC initiative and 
the Millennium Development Goals, which all focused on bringing the extreme poor to 
“the bottom rung of the ladder”.  However, after years of aid-dependent countries 
including Sachs’ solution for ending poverty into their national Poverty Reduction 
Strategies, the levels of poverty still remain unabated and in some countries poverty has 
actually increased (see Okolo 2012).   
This obviously points to the fact that there are some weaknesses associated with 
Sachs’ proposal for development. His proposal to ensure development in the global South 





countries under Structural Adjustment Policies as his argument can be summarized as: 
while poor countries should still pursue trade liberalization, privatization and 
stabilization, the burden of poverty reduction should not be so heavy on them; they 
should be supported with aid. Moreover, Sachs’ argument takes a limited approach to 
poverty reduction as he suggests developing countries continue pursuing neoliberal 
policies which will engender economic growth for poverty reduction.  
 Additionally, his proposal that the provision of basic needs, such as primary 
education, food, safe water, mosquito net among others, to the poor will uplift the poor to 
the bottom rung of the development ladder where they will be able to escape poverty by 
themselves over the years has proved to be inadequate in reducing poverty. This is 
because it assumes a limited approach to poverty reduction. For instance, urging poor 
countries to concentrate on primary education as a means of reducing poverty implies 
focusing their limited educational budgets on primary education at the expense of training 
skilled personnel at higher institutions is quite problematic, particularly when the primary 
educational system does not provide people with the skills needed to get a job or create an 
employment opportunity for themselves. A study by Gay (2005) in Lesotho shows that 
the government’s policy of free universal basic education encouraged high basic school 
enrollment, however, about 70 percent of students terminated their education after 
completing primary school because there was not enough government provision to ensure 
continuation. Many of these students ended up jobless and poor because they lacked the 





Another major challenge with Sachs’ proposal is the elision of processes that will 
ensure that developing countries industrialise.  One could argue rightly that development 
solutions for poor countries, particularly those in Africa, which are endowed with natural 
resources should focus largely on how to add value to these resources. This is because 
such approaches to development  will create employment and reduce the over  
dependence on imported value added goods in developing countries which has created 
huge developmental bottlenecks such as trade deficits, balance of payment deficit among 
other development challenges for poor countries. Thus, in order for poor countries to 
develop, they must go beyond the suggestions of Sachs and the international development 
community.                                  
 
Neoliberalism as Part of International Development Programmes   
Neoliberalism is a response to social liberalism in the late 20th century; it led to 
monetarist economic policies and a reduction in the government provision of social 
services.  It all came about in the wake of the severe recession in the global North and the 
world’s economy as a whole in 1979, which precipitated the so-called debt crises in the 
South in 1981 -1982 (Crouch ,2011,p2). This development model came out as a result of 
the disillusionment that the involvement of the state in economic and social life led to 
economic inefficiencies, bureaucracy, and unnecessary drain of the public coffers. Hence, 
the need to sell loss-making and inefficient public enterprises and government parastatal 





In essence, neoliberalism is an economic agenda that seeks to deregulate the 
market as much as possible to promote free trade.  The neoliberal ideology after its 
introduction rapidly became the economic orthodoxy in the global North and was 
exported to the South via policies and measures formulated to address the debt crises. 
What defines the concrete policies advocated by neoliberalism is believed to be John 
Williamson’s “Washington Consensus”, which is a list of policy proposals that is 
believed to have gained consensus approval among the Washington-based international 
economic organizations, the IMF and the World Bank. These proposals include fiscal 
policy discipline, the redirection of public spending from subsidies toward broad-based 
provision of key pro-growth and pro-poor services, tax reform, competitive exchange 
rates, trade liberalization and liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, 
privatization of state enterprises, deregulation, and legal security for property rights 
(Veltmeyer, 2012).  
   Neoliberal policies are mainly exported to developing countries, particularly the 
global South by the World Bank in the form “recommendations” as part of a debt relief 
package. However, most of the times, these recommendations are tied to binding 
conditionalities such that countries virtually have no options. Even if these countries 
disagree with the recommendations, they are bound to implement them, if they wish to 
continue receiving debt relief or receiving concessional lending, or even grant-based 
technical assistance. These neoliberal policies have been an integral part of international 





Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), the Heavy Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative and the National Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). 
 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) 
The SAPs were first introduced to the global South in the early 1980s by the IMF 
as a result of the inability of most these developing countries to service their foreign debt 
(Bond and Dor, 2003, p. 2).  The IMF provided a bailout for these indebted poor countries 
and in exchange gained power over the poor countries to impose conditionalities in the 
form of austere macroeconomic policies, which emphasised liberalisation, export 
orientation, currency devaluation and an end to social subsidies. These imposed 
conditionalities were eventually applied to broader structural issues in the national 
economies of those poor countries, hence the name structural adjustment policies 
(Mckinley, 2004, p. 2).  The World Bank also stepped in, expanding beyond individual 
project and sector loans so as to finance the full-fledged structural adjustment.   
Consequently, the overall national development strategies of poor countries were 
replaced with by the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs).The claim made by the 
IMF for imposing the SAPs on poor indebted countries in the global South was that it will 
make these countries become viable members of the international economy, and not least 
enable them to meet their debt obligations as the programmes will bring about economic 
success (Gunter, 2002, p. 7). Similarly, the World Bank, whose previous interest was 
centred on poverty and infrastructure development, joined the IMF in the SAP evolution 





(Mckinley, 2004, p. 2). However, these claims made by the IMF and World Bank 
remained elusive throughout the period of the SAP implementation until it was replaced. 
There is little doubt that the effects of SAPs in poor countries, particularly in 
Africa led to worsened conditions. The debt crisis of developing countries  remained 
unsolved and actually worsened over time .In 1997 for instance,  developing countries 
found out they still had more than $2 trillion in foreign debt to repay compared to  $1.3 
trillion during the early 1980s when the debt crisis broke out and $1.4 trillion in 1990. As 
a result, developing countries had to pay more in debt servicing and in the same 1997 for 
example, they paid $270 billion to service their debt compared to $160 billion in 1990. 
Similarly, in Africa alone, countries that implemented the SAPs paid $162 billion more 
than they received in new loans in 1997, up from $60 billion in 1990 (Jubilee 2000, 
1997).  
Moreover,  the quality of life of people in countries that implemented the SAPs  
declined considerably as prices of commodities increased , infrastructural development 
and social service provision deteriorated and employment opportunities were reduced 
(Konadu-Agyemeng, 2000, p.482).  It was also noted that currency devaluation, which 
was a major part of the SAPs and intended to make exported goods from developing 
countries cheaper in order to increase their demand, had adverse effects on the prices of 
non-traded items, especially household necessities as these items became too expensive to 
purchase locally. For instance, Riddel (1992) noted that the prices of basic household 
commodities in Sierra Leone skyrocketed immediately after devaluation in 1986: a bar of 





kerosene from 9.00 to 23.00 leone: and a chicken from 20.00 to 80.00. The devaluation 
also increased the cost of many other essential items, particularly imported heavy duty 
equipments such as farm and factory inputs needed to boost production, medicines and 
medical equipments needed to provide better a health-care system, among other items 
needed for infrastructural development (57). The consequence was that life became too 
expensive and that there was a reduction in the standard of living, particularly for the poor 
in many of the countries that implemented the SAPs.  
In addition, the conditionalities under the SAP, which forcibly prevented 
governments from influencing the working of the economy, affected the lives of many 
people in those countries negatively. This was mainly because the greatest source of 
employment in most of these countries prior to the SAPs was found in the public sector. 
For instance, in Ghana, 1000s of jobs were lost after state-owned companies were 
privatised and many government parastatals collapsed (Gregory, 2014, p 
17).Notwithstanding, the liberalisation of trade led to the loss of employment as several 
local industries collapsed as a result of increased imports. The SAPs also introduced  
unprecedented cuts in government  expenditures on public services and social welfare and  
user fees for health and education, which did not only increase the number of the poor , 
but  also increased their  plight by making them even poorer. 
Above all is the failure of the SAPs to produce growth that was sufficient and pro 
poor enough to reduce poverty and hardships that the introduction of the programmes had 
created (Adejumobi, 2006, p. 3). As a matter of fact, the adverse effects of the SAPs were 





countries, particularly in Africa as they experienced economic decline during the period 
of the programmes’ implementation. In sub-Saharan Africa, countries under the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes experienced growth decline from 2.7percent in 1980 to 
1.8percent in 1987 as well as decline in the investment/GDP ratio from 20.6percent to 
17.1percent in those same years (UNECA, 1989, p. 22-23). The SAPs were also noted to 
have engendered various forms of inequalities in countries as growth failed to trickle 
down to the poor and in turn served as a ground for further deepening of poverty 
(Konadu-Agyemeng, 2000, p. 480). In Ghana for instance, the SAPs were noted to have 
contributed to increasing inequality, particularly horizontal inequality as they involved 
large-scale changes in the distribution and redistribution of resources, which left some 
places particularly northern Ghana worse off (ibid). 
Thus, despite the claim by the IMF and the World Bank that SAPs will make 
countries adjust their economies and make them economically viable in order to address 
their debt issues as well as reduce poverty, the programmes rather entrenched poverty and 
increased the debt burden of the countries that implemented them. These economic crisis 
and social hardships, which were associated with the SAPs, called for criticisms against 
the programmes such that World Bank and IMF responded to these criticisms by 
introducing the Structural Adjustment with a Human Face, which was first experimented 
in Ghana as the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment 
(PAMSCAD). This intervention was followed by the HIPC initiative in the mid 1990s by 
the Bretton Woods institutions to assist countries that implemented the SAPs to address 





  Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative  
The HIPC initiative is a framework jointly developed by the World Bank and IMF 
in 1996 to address the external debt problems of the heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs) by reducing their debt burden to sustainable levels (Boote and Thugge, 1997, p. 
2).  This initiative defines a country as heavily indebted if so-called ‘traditional debt 
relief mechanisms’ are unlikely to reduce its external debt to a sustainable level with the 
debt sustainability largely determined by a net present value (NPV) debt-to-export 
ratio of 200-250% ( Gunter, 2002, p. 5). 
However, three years after launching the initiative, it was clear that the original 
HIPC framework was not a sufficient solution as poor countries foreign debt kept 
increasing (ibid, p. 6). As a result, there were criticisms and protests against the HIPC 
initiative with some calling for the debts of poor countries to be entirely cancelled. Some 
of the major arguments raised in support of the debt cancellation were that the 
international financial institutions and the trans-national corporations had caused and 
were continuing to cause extensive damage to the people and environment in global 
South. As such, northern countries were also indebted to poor countries in ecological and 
historical terms; hence the debt of poor countries in the South should be cancelled (Bond 
and Dor, 2003, p. 8). These demands against the HIPC initiative towards the end of the 
1990s yielded results as at the G8 meeting in Cologne, Germany, in 1999, the government 
leaders announced to overhaul   the HIPC initiative, which later came to be known as the 





Under the HIPC 2, the World Bank and IMF imposed upon HIPC countries a new 
requirement; they would be required to produce PRSPs showing strategies that would be 
used to reduce poverty in order to be eligible for debt relief and for new borrowing 
(Abdullah and Hulme, 2014, p. 6). However, under PRSP approach, the World Bank and 
IMF placed emphasis on country ownership of development policies and civil society 
participation in the formulation of National Poverty Reduction Strategies. Thus, the 
PRSPs were intended to be distinguished in approach from former SAPs, which were a 
failure. The IFIs emphasised on broad based participation and national ownership of 
policies as part of the enhanced HIPC initiative because according to them, the failure of 
the SAPs was mainly the lack of national enthusiasm to implement the SAPs, 
undemocratic governance as well as corruption (Stewart and Wang, 2003, p. 2). 
In so doing, the IFIs used the PRSP under the enhanced HIPC initiative to create a 
false impression that they were keeping the undemocratic and corrupt indebted countries 
on the straight and narrow.  Moreover, by linking the enhanced HIPC debt relief to the 
preparation and implementation of nationally-owned poverty reduction strategies, it 
appeared that the IFIs were concerned about poverty reduction, hence placed the debt 
relief initiative within an overall framework of poverty. This was a smokescreen; the 
PRSP was another form of conditionality used to promote the neoliberal policy advice 
espoused by the IFIs during the era of Structural Adjustment Policies. The PRSPs 
emphasised on policies such as trade liberalization, fiscal and monetary discipline, 
privatization of state-owned businesses and deregulation of labour markets as part of the 





initiative, debt was not taken seriously as a technical problem that needed to be solved. 
Rather, it was used as an instrument by the IFIs to further tighten their grips over poor 
countries in keeping them under neoliberal agenda, particularly at the time that the 
neoliberal practice was under criticism and faced the threat of replacement.  
 
 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
As noted above, the PRSPs were introduced in 1999 as an international 
development policy following the criticisms of the Structural Adjustment Policies for 
rather aggravating poverty in poor countries. A key criterion for the implementation of 
the PRSP initiative has been that a country must already have implemented, to a degree, 
IMF and World Bank-supported SAPs. In the absence of this, Interim-PRSPs would have 
to be implemented in order to gradually create the legal and policy bases for the 
introduction of the comprehensive Poverty Reduction Strategy (Stewart and Wang 2003, 
p 8). 
 The PRSP is said to be uniquely presented on three accounts, which makes it 
different form the SAPs .Firstly, it is foregrounded  in the concept of poverty reduction, 
which represents an overall  poverty reduction strategy framework on an individual 
country basis, integrating policy and budgetary commitments across sectors and between 
macro- and micro-levels. Secondly, the policy content of a PRSP is to reflect the 
concerted policy co-ordination efforts of relevant global institutions whose goal is the 





participatory processes, especially at the community level. Thus, it advocates for a policy 
formulation process that advances a ‘bottom-up’ rather than a ‘top-down’ process of 
governance. In this context, the PRSPs were presented as ‘country-owned’ and ‘country-
driven’ project. According to IMF (2000), this emphasis on country ownership and 
participation were both “intended to reduce the risk of slippages in implementation as the 
countries themselves take greater responsibility for the design and success of their 
economic plans”, and also ensure the accountability of decision-makers to domestic 
constituencies (p. 114). Moreover, broad-based participation and national ownership were 
expected to enhance the accountability of decision-makers to domestic constituencies 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2008) and by extension “elicit greater commitment to equitable and 
efficient development policies” (Booth, 2005, p. 1). 
From what are stated above to be the principles of the PRSP, it is clear that the 
PRSPs seek to make reforms that are different from the SAP, particularly with regards to 
its political premises, which emphasises on country ownership. However, analysing the 
design and implementation of the PRSPs shows that the PRSP approach does not differ in 
process and content from earlier SAPs. In what follows, we will interrogate some reforms 
associated with the PRSPs; its principle of country ownership and the content of the 
PRSPs in order to determine if the PRSPs indeed differ significantly from the SAPs.  
The claim that the PRSPs are country owned is highly debatable, particularly 
when the PRSPs are supposed to be compatible with the guiding policies set in the PRSP 
Sourcebook, which are drafted  to reflect the “institutional objectives  of the World Bank 





reduction strategies are subject to the  decision of the executive boards of the World Bank 
and IMF, based on conditionalities that cover all important social measures, governance 
reforms, anti-poverty strategies themselves and most importantly, economic decisions and 
many structural policies. As a matter of fact, the World Bank and the IMF over the years 
have been increasingly dictatorial, controlling developing countries through increased 
conditionality to ensure that these countries oblige to their neoliberal agenda as against 
pursuing the challenging process of achieving outright ownership. For instance, in 
Honduras an NGO network, Interforos, was told by government officials that ‘the Fund’s 
conditionalities with regard to macro-economic policies were not negotiable’ (Knoke and 
Morazan, 2002, p. 16). This notion of placing conditionalities on national policies of 
developing countries by the IFIs creates a conflict of interest, which sabotages the so 
called PRSPs’ principle of country ownership. The IMF and World Bank, which place a 
great deal of emphasis on supporting capacity development for national ‘ownership’ of 
PRSPs, cannot be the same institutions that set the conditionalities for countries. 
Moreover, the act of the IFIs dictating to aid recipient countries in the form of 
conditionalities disempowers these countries from designing and embarking on their own 
national strategies as they are made to only tailor their policies to satisfy external 
priorities.  In essence, the notion of conditionality and the conflict between this and 
ownership is a significant contradiction that makes the PRSPs’ basic principle of country 
ownership impotent. 
As part of the reforms to ensure that the Poverty Reductions Strategies increase 





based national participatory processes. However, while the PRSP process assumes that 
participation will increase national ownership, analysts have argued that how far it does 
depend on who participates, whether participation actually affects the design of the 
programmes, or merely provides endorsement to externally designed programmes 
(Whitfield, 2005, p. 648). However, the PRSPs have failed to address some of these 
critical issues of which actors should be involved and what degree of influence should 
each actor have in the national participation process and how national consensus should 
be achieved. Consequently, what has happened is that most countries that implemented 
the PRSPs, national  participation has been  so limited that  civil society, community 
groups and the general public  are  often by-passed or involved scantily in consultation 
process designed to elicit it a rubber stamp for strategies already formulated(Driscoll and 
Evans, 2005) . Stewart and Wang (2003) in their  analysis of the first 30 PRSPs produced, 
concluded that national  participation in the PRSPs was seriously flawed because of some 
of these reasons : (i) key sections of civil society(e.g., women, religious organisations, 
workers’ movements, rural groups) and government (e.g., line ministries and parliament) 
were missing from the process or insufficiently represented, (ii) the design of 
participation  specifically excluded or neglected particular groups of the general public 
.(iii) the participation  was  narrowed by rushed timeframes, a lack of information, poor 
dissemination in appropriate languages, and consultation processes which failed to reach 
local and rural communities ( p.16). A significant revelation in their analysis was that in 
almost no case did civil society participate in the drafting the framework for initial 





teams of external consultants or central ministry staff (ibid 17). In Ghana for instance, 
PRSP was mainly between the executive branch of government and the donor 
community, such that even the parliament was largely by-passed in the process of donor-
government 'policy dialogue' (Whitfield, 2005, p.  648). Thus, as far as national PRSPs 
are concerned, the principle of national ownership is seriously flawed as national 
participation has not been broad based but limited to few government officials.  
 It has also been argued that the most effective way to assess whether the PRSPs 
have increased the ownership of policies of aid recipient countries is to explore how the 
national PRSPs differ from one another and also how far they have altered the basic thrust 
of the IFIs’ SAPs (Werber, 2006, p. 6). In this sense, we would expect that if the PRSPs 
were truly nationally owned, at least some them would exhibit different strategies or 
propose strategies that are different from the standard aid- policy prescriptions in the past. 
However, a striking feature of nearly all PRSPs is the consistency among their approaches 
to poverty reduction. All country programmes are based on the premise that private-sector 
led growth is the most effective way to reduce poverty ( Adejumobi  2006, p. 19) and 
most do not consider alternative approaches to poverty reduction, particularly those with 
an element of resource redistribution (Stewart and Wang ,2003, p. 20). 
 In addition, the macro-economic and structural contents of most countries’ PRSPs  
also reveals that there is no fundamental departure from the kind of policy advice 
provided under earlier Structural Adjustment Programmes. A study of the first 30 
completed PRSPs shows that these policies contain all the elements designed to promote 





public sector reform, sectoral policies in infrastructure, energy and manufacturing and 
social sector reform that were paramount in the first generation aid policy prescriptions 
(Stewart and Wang, 2003, p, 20-22). As a result, the PRSPs have been widely recognised 
as Structural Adjustment with few modifications on the social content imposed on aid 
recipient countries.  
The fact that so little variation of policies, particularly macroeconomic policies  
exists across an extremely broad range of country PRSPs, and that these country 
programmes are conditional on IFIs endorsement before qualifying for new lending, 
strongly suggests that national ownership  was greatly constrained. Moreover, the 
widespread   limitation of citizens’ participation in the PRS process in various developing 
countries that implemented the PRSP suggests the policies were not nationally owned. 
In essence, the so called reforms of country ownership and broad based 
participation which signal true national ownership of policies claimed to be made towards 
the PRSP approach has not produced changes in the ways in which the IFIs operate in 
developing countries. These reforms have been used as a ‘hoax’ by the IFIs to regain the 
credibility and re-establish their hegemony after they were criticised for the introduction 
of the SAPs and more importantly deepen neoliberal domination in the South. The PRSPs 
have been used to only create a   perception of possession in the minds of governments 
and local people of developing countries as they are induced to believe they have 
ownership of policies when in essence they are only allowed to tinker around policies that 
are already made by donors. These poor countries are only encouraged to agree with a 





neoliberal agenda. For the PRSPs to achieve genuine national ownership there is the need 
for national empowerment, a situation where both government and the civil society have a 
greater say in the design of policies that affect them 
 
Poverty Reduction and Increased Regional Inequality 
 Since the introduction of the PRSP and its associated enhanced HIPC initiative, 
which were both placed within the overall framework of poverty reduction, regional 
disparity within countries has been on the rise such that countries like Ghana and Uganda, 
even touted by the IFIs to be successful with the implementation of the Poverty Reduction 
Programmes have experienced regional disparity (see okolo 2012, p34). Yet, the issue of 
reducing spatial inequalities in countries that implemented the Poverty Reduction 
Programmes appears to have received limited attention in the Poverty Reduction 
Programmes debates. In this section of the review, we will analyse these Poverty 
Reduction Programmes and their impact on regional inequality  
First of all, as noted above, the PRSP and the enhanced HIPC initiative as poverty 
reduction programmes were used by the IFIs to promote neoliberal policies such as trade 
liberalization, fiscal and monetary discipline, and privatization of state-owned businesses 
and deregulation of labour markets in order to promote their neoliberal agenda in poor 
countries.  These neoliberal policies, particularly the macroeconomic policies such as the 
reduction in trade barriers, market deregulation among other liberal policies have ushered 
developing countries into the global economy (Kanbur and Venables, 2005, p. 1). 





address issues of regional inequality in developing countries. This is because  
globalisation leads to greater specialisation in production and the dispersion of specialised 
production processes to geographically distant locations and this is expected to benefit  
developing countries, especially  poor regions within these countries, which have 
comparative advantage in producing unskilled labour-intensive goods and services. 
Another argument in support of neoliberal policies addressing regional inequalities within 
countries is the World Bank’s argument which states that  neoliberal policies expedite 
national growth which will trickle down to reduce poverty under which reducing spatial 
dimensions  of poverty is subsumed (World Bank, 2009). 
 Contrary to these arguments, evidence from many developing economies 
including Ghana, shows an increasing regional disparity since the implementation of the 
neoliberal policies (Aryeetey-Attoh and Chatterjee, 1998, p.34; Grant and Nijman, 2003, 
p. 467). According to  Fan et al, (2009), neoliberal policies, which promote global trade, 
benefit regions with geographical advantage such as those found on the coast 
disproportionately compared to interior regions of the same country due to their proximity 
to the international market and more developed economies (p 9). In support of this 
argument, Ghana, since the introduction of the neoliberal policies has been experiencing 
an increasing differences in poverty reduction between Greater Accra region, which is 
located at the coast and also serves as the country’s gateway to the global market and 
other interior regions, particularly those in the North, which are on the margins of global 
capitalist market (GSS, 2007, p. 17). Grant and Nijman( 2003) also note that the pursuit 





region as its  share of the country’s FDI has grown from about 60 percent in the 1980s  to 
about  86 percent in 1999 (p. 474). 
 Brown et al (2007) also argue that the pursuit of neoliberal policies such export 
promotion in developing countries mostly benefit regions whose geographical locations 
and other initial conditions are better suited for export-oriented production as they grow 
faster than regions without or with less conditions suited for export production (4). To 
corroborate this argument by Brown et al (2007), Aryeetey et al (2009) noted that export 
promotion under Ghana’s Poverty Reduction Programmes has enhanced growth and 
poverty reduction in the country’s South where most of the country’s exports are 
produced compared to the North whose economy is dominated by local food production 
(p,11). 
In addition, it has been contended that the PRSP and HIPC  have been used to 
further weaken the control of  poor countries over powerful global actors, with adverse 
consequences on the ability of national governments to implement policies of their choice 
(Mkandawire, 2004; Abdulai, 2009), including their scope to attend to more equitable 
forms of development. In support of this argument, a review of the first round PRSPs by 
Booth and Curran (2007) shows that majority of countries’ PRSPs had recognised the 
need to address regional inequalities as a major objective in their policy documents (p. 3, 
4). However, in the implementation of these PRSPs, most of these countries did not 
adequately address the problem of regional inequality. Rather, almost all the countries 
were focused on the implementation of the neoliberal macroeconomic policies imposed 





considered for loans under the HIPC initiative. As as a result, regional disparities in many 
developing countries have persisted and in some cases, even worsened over the years of 
PRSPs implementation (ibid, p.13). In related argument, (Obeng-Odoom, 2012) notes that 
the pursuit of neoliberal policies under the PRSPs promote a pro market economy in most 
poor countries where the market usually multinational companies become important 
instruments of development which can influence the location of economic activities (p. 
95). Also, Aryeetey et al. (2009) in support of the above argument, have contended  that 
in a pro market economy where market becomes a dictator of economic activities 
determining the location of economic resources, regional inequalities increase. This is 
because  in such pro market economies  where the market influences the location of  
economic activities, new economic activities and growth tend to be concentrated in an 
already ‘developed’ region where economies of scale are enjoyed and returns on 
investments are relatively higher rather than the ‘lagging’ or ‘undeveloped’ regions (p,6). 
In corroborating the above argument, a recent study by Grimm and Klasen (2007) in 14 
developing countries evinces that in a liberal, pro-market economy, where the role of the 
state is confined to creating a level playing field for private sector-led growth, inhabitants 
of underdeveloped regions have been further marginalized with poverty incidence 
increasing in those regions (15).    
Another argument made to emphasise increased regional inequality under the 
PRSP and the HIPC initiative is that aid under these policy programmes given to poor 
countries, especially those with ethnically-biased governments to spend on poverty 





regions ahead of others (Brown et al 2007, p 9). These authors cite the case of Nepal 
where for a long time the government has been ethnically biased as an example. The 
authors note that General Budget Support (GBS), which is a form of aid under the PRSP 
and the HIPC initiative, in Nepal has been used to favour areas where politically 
dominant groups, the Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar ethnic groups live as opposed to other 
ethnic groups (ibid). Similarly, Abdullah (2012) shows  how the distribution of projects 
under the  HIPC initiative in Ghana benefitted the southern part of the country more than 
the country’s northern part  because influential positions in government at time was 
dominated by ‘Southners’ (P, 170-177).These examples about the unequal spatial  
distribution of resources under the HIPC above raise questions about  the “theory of 
political change that underlies PRSPs which assumes  that  the principle of national 
ownership will lead to equitable development within countries” (Hickey and Mohan, 
2008). The implicit assumption of the PRSPs that national ownership will lead to 
equitable development in poor countries is a ‘mistaken’ interpretation of the character of 
politics in most developing countries, which is highly influenced by politics of 
clientelism.    
                                    
 
Thesis Statement  
Despite Ghana’s PRSPs’ claim that the programmes will reduce poverty, we are 
arguing that the design and  implementation of the PRSPs and HIPC initiatives have 





with the South experiencing a decrease in poverty levels while the North saw an increase. 
We are making this argument for the following reasons:  
First, the PRSPs are firmly grounded in the neoliberal ideology, which prioritises 
the promotion of export-oriented policies, and market-oriented policies and thus, tend to   
benefit regions with the characteristics or conditions that support these policies rather 
than regions without such conditions. For instance, regions with commodities that are in 
demand in the global market under export promotion policies benefit more than regions 
without exportable commodities because the former attract more invest particularly FDI 
than the later. Also, neoliberal polices such as trade liberalisation, among others, which 
promote global trade, concentrate trading activities in regions with geographic advantages 
such as regions with sea ports as they usually serve as the national gateway to the 
international markets. Thus, regions with such geographic advantages under neoliberal 
policies tend to benefit more than interior regions which are located on the margins of the 
global economy. Similarly, relatively developed regions with economic and commercial 
activities under the neoliberal economic model of the PRSPs, attract more capital 
particularly from the private sector than less developed regions because the former enjoys 
economies of scale of production. 
Second, HIPC resources, which are supposed to be used for poverty reduction 
programmes and projects, in many developing countries are abused in their 
implementation process to favour some regions ahead of others. One major reason noted 
for this, is the large presence of politics of clientelism and patronage spending in many of 





its principles of country ownership and public accountability will engender equitable 
development outcomes. In what follows, we will see how the implementation of the 
PRSP and the distribution of the HIPC funds favoured Ghana’s southern regions more 
than the northern regions.  
Ghana’s PRSPs promoted export-oriented policies, which favoured the country’s 
South where the export sector is largely concentrated and there is better access to the 
seaports and relatively lower transportation costs. Ghana’s PRSPs particularly favoured 
the cocoa sector, which constitutes the country’s highest export earnings and mainly 
concentrated in southern Ghana, by providing the sector with support such as increasing 
the producer price paid to cocoa farmers, free mass spraying of cocoa farms to control 
pest and diseases among others in order to increase its production and export. 
Consequently, this preferential support given to the cocoa sector coupled with a relatively 
high international market price in the 2000s led to the increase in its production. This 
contributed to poverty reduction in the South, particularly in the rural areas where poverty 
is relatively high. However, the North’s economy mainly centred on local food crop 
production which was neglected under the PRSPs. Notwithstanding, cotton, the major 
cash crop from the North did not receive any major support under Ghana’s PRSP mainly 
because of the less profitability of the sector, which was mainly due to very low world 
market price in the 2000s. Additionally, the country’s already developed South, which 
relatively enjoys economies of scale of production such as better transportation system 





under country’s PRSPs as productive investment from both the private and public sector 
were concentrated in the South.   
In addition, the distribution of the country’s HIPC grant influenced by politics of 
clientelism in the country favoured the South where the ruling party then had its support 
base. In a nutshell, this thesis argues that Ghana’s PRSP increased the inequality between 
the country’s North and South mainly because the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategies 
Papers and the enhanced HIPC initiative were used to promote the neoliberal policies, 
which served the neoliberal agenda of the IFIs.  These neoliberal policies however, 
benefitted the country’s  South by reducing poverty in the regions as it had the resources 
and economy that  serve the neoliberal agenda while the North, which had a different 






In order to support my thesis statement that the PRSPs promoted neoliberal policies 
which benefitted the country’s South more than the North, we analysed Ghana’s PRSPs 
and the HIPC initiative to determine how these policies influenced the country’s North 
and South inequality. Thus, this study is a policy analysis of the Poverty Reduction 





outcomes of Ghana’s implementation of its PRSPs and HIPC initiative; how they 
benefitted the South more than the North.  
In order to achieve this objective, the following four main sets of data were used. 
(i) the regional composition of HIPC expenditure, and this data was used because the 
HIPC initiative was a major donor support of  which 80 percent of the monies realised 
from it was supposed to be used for poverty reduction in the country; (ii) regional 
distribution of private sector-led investment under the period of PRS implementation   
(2000 to 2010), and this data was used because private sector development was the 
central theme of the GPRS I; (iii) the production of major export commodities and this 
study utilises the production of the two main cash crops from the North and South, cotton 
and cocoa respectively. This data was chosen because  Ghana’s PRSP, particularly the 
GPRS II main  focus was on  promoting export agriculture as a means of reducing 
poverty in the country ; (iv) regional performance of the MDGs from (2000 to 2013), this 
data was chosen because both the country’s PRSPs and HIPC initiative were supposed to 
be the guiding policies for achieving the MDGs  
  The data used in the study was garnered from a variety of primary and secondary 
sources.  Primary data used includes data from Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) 
from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic 
Research (ISSER University of Ghana), SEND foundation, the websites of the World 
Bank, IMF, UNDP, ADB and UNECA, FAO, from other websites, databases, archival 








The research conducted for this policy analysis just as almost every research has 
its limits, had its own. One major methodological challenge faced in this study was the 
problem of limited data particularly data that was regionally disaggregated. One of such 
difficulties was the collection of data on regional distribution of HIPC resources. In 
accounting for the regional distribution of the HIPC resources, we mainly used direct 
disbursement of the HIPC funds to the various district assemblies in all the regions even 
though considerable amount of the resources was given to central government Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies. This was because getting regional data on HIPC resources 
given to these Ministries, Departments and Agencies proved to be almost impossible as 
documents containing such data are mostly not in the public domain. Nonetheless, we 
managed to get some of the data on HIPC funded projects and programmes from the 
Ministries, Department and Agencies which regional data was available was used.   
Another major difficulty that this study was confronted with was  using poverty 
figures from the Ghana Living Standard Survey 6 in 2012/2013 (GLSS 6) which is the 
most recent data on national poverty figures .The study for most part could not utilise 
GLSS 6 poverty figures because of a  rebasing of the poverty line in 2012/2013 that 
caused a break in the series of living standard survey conducted from 1991 to 2006 , 
thereby making it difficult to carry out a regional  trend analysis from 1991/92 which is 





to poverty data from GLSS 3 (1991/1992), GLSS 4(1998/1999) and particularly the 

























Chapter 2: Ghana’s North – South Regional Inequality  
                                                      Introduction  
In this chapter, we will begin by showing a brief regional profile of Ghana in 
order to show a distinction between the regions referred to as the North and those referred 
to as the South. We will also show the differences in geography and economy of these 
regions in order to present a true picture of the divide between the North and South. In 
this chapter, we will also discuss the origin of North and South inequality in Ghana. After 
that, we will outline and discuss the many development initiatives undertaken by Ghana   
to address the development gap that has existed between the North and South of the 
country from its independence till 2000, which is the period before the implementation of 
the country’s PRSP and its associated HIPC initiative. 
 
Country Background: the Distinction between North and South  
Ghana is located in the West Africa sub-region of Africa. It has an area of about 
238,537km², and is bordered on the east, west, and north by the countries of Togo, Cote 
d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso respectively.  However, to the South it is bordered by the 
Atlantic Ocean. Ghana’s total population in last population census in 2010 was 24.5 
million with an estimated annual population growth rate of 2.5%. About 56 percent of the 
country’s total population lives in rural areas, and the remaining 44 percent live in 
settlements defined as urban that is settlements with 5000 or more inhabitants  .( GSS, 
2013, p. 50).The country is divided into 10 administrative regions, and each of these 





capital and district capital respectively. In all, as of 2015, Ghana had 10 regions and 216 
districts in the country. According to Ayeertey et al (2009), this  division of the country 
into districts and regions,  is largely based on the need to maintain large cultural groups as 
homogenous units as well as the need for efficient administration of districts and regions 
(Ayeertey et al, 2009, p 7).  
Ghana covers an area of about 239,000 km2 and comprises three broad distinct 
ecological zones: a small coastal zone, a forest zone and a large savannah zone in the 
North (McKayet al., 2005). Given significant regional development disparities, however, 
some scholars have suggested the need to think of Ghana as comprising just two broad 
regions, the North and the South (Boateng et al., 1990, p. 29).  However, the regions 
administratively referred to as the “North” are also referred to as the Savanna regions 
because the savanna vegetation of the country is found in these areas.  The North refers to 
three administrative regions in the northern part of the country: the Northern Region, 
Upper-East Region and Upper –West Region. The remaining seven referred to as the 
southern regions include Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Central, Eastern, Greater Accra, Volta 
and Western Region. The North consists of 41% of the land area of Ghana, although it is 
home to only about 20% of the country’s population (Abdullah, 2012, p. 15).  
The structure of Ghana’s economy has not changed significantly from that 
inherited from its colonial masters (Aryeetey and McKay 2007; Aryeetey and Kanbur 
2008). It is dominated by agriculture and the primary sector in terms of their contribution 





about 40percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and accounts for about 50 percent 
of all employment (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2008). The main export items of the country are 
primary commodities mainly: cocoa, gold, timber, and bauxite with cocoa earnings  alone 
constituting about 45 percent of total export receipts.  
However, in terms of the structure of the national economy, there are significant 
differences between the North and South. The North lacks natural resources that meet the 
trading priorities of the global North and its economy is dominated by local food crop 
agriculture, which is mostly on a subsistence level. Moreover, its distance away from the 
coast and limited number of urban centres has lessened commercial activities in the 
region.  The South on the other hand has relatively higher economic activities because of 
its proximity to the coast, presence of big cities and more importantly availability of 
natural resources prioritised by the global North. It is important to note that the country’s 
major exports listed above are all concentrated in the South.  
 
Origin of Ghana’s North –South Inequality 
The natural geographical conditions although present Ghana’s North and South with 
different natural resources and advantages, these resources by themselves did not create 
inequalities between these two regions. It is noted that before colonialism, standard of 
living in northern Ghana was worthwhile. The pre-colonial mode of production in 
northern Ghana generally conformed to what has been described by as the “African type 





subsistence agriculture and trading. Commodities that were produced then formed part of 
domestic consumption and the surplus put into the trading circuit (Plange, 2007, p. 10).    
It was the invasion of Europeans and their capitalist mode development which gave 
different values to these resources hence making some regions more developed than 
others. In what follows, we will discuss how colonial policies brought about the North –
South inequality.  
Colonial Policies from 1800s to 1957 
The present socio-economic inequalities between the North and the South are not 
new, but have their origins in British colonial policies that subordinated the interest of the 
North to that of the South, both by excluding the former from public investments and 
through its adverse incorporation into the colonial economy as a pool of cheap labour. 
Broadly speaking, the advent of European trade, notably the slave trade, increased   
“tribal” wars that changed the face of pre-colonial state formations and ethno-regional 
relations in Africa and not least introduced new relations of ‘superior-inferior’ groups 
based on military strength and new forms of conquest and dominance (Osaghae, 2006).  
Although colonial rule marked the end of slave raiding in many countries, the 
colonial state itself set the stage for uneven regional development in various ways on the 
continent, which Ghana was no exception. After the establishment of British colonial 
government, Ghana then Gold Coast was divided into regions based on the need to 
maintain large or major ethnic groups as homogenous and unified entities as far as 





Bening 1999). However, there were significant differences in how these regions were 
administered by the colonial government in terms of expenditure and investment. 
According to Dickson (1971), the colonial government’s investment in the regions were 
based on three criteria: presence of exploitable and exportable resources, the ease with 
which cultivation could be encouraged of introduced cash or tree crops (mainly cocoa, 
coffee and rubber) and the ease with which these resources could be transported to the 
seaports (i.e. proximity to the coast).  On the basis of the aforementioned criteria, regions 
that satisfied the three criteria received more government investment as they were 
subsequently connected with transportation links, mainly railways and roads, and other 
infrastructure.  Regions in southern Ghana with climate suitable for the introduced cash 
and tree crops of cocoa, coffee and rubber, and the vegetation suitable for timber 
exploitation, as well as mining sites closer to the coast or ports attracted colonial 
investments. On the other hand, northern Ghana with the climate not suitable for the 
introduced cash crops, and relatively far from the coast and seaports received less of 
colonial investments (Owusu, 2005).  
Moreover, the North’s economy, which also thrived on the trans-Saharan trade, 
was collapsed with the advent of the colonial rulers who re-oriented existing trade routes 
that had benefitted the North. The North, because of its geographic advantage as middle 
state between states in southern Ghana and others in West Africa as well as the Sahelian 
and Mediterranean regions had benefitted from the long- distance trade that  existed 
between these states (Songsore 2003). However, the introduction of maritime trade routes 





North and also directed trade to the benefit of the regions in the South, which were closer 
to the coast.  
In addition to the exclusion of the region from productive economic activities, 
northern Ghana was further impoverished by the colonial government by exploiting the 
human capital in the area through their adverse incorporation into the wider Ghanaian 
economy as sources of cheap labour.  There was a deliberate strategy by the colonial 
government to make the North a pool of cheap labour for the mines and cocoa farms in 
the South and also for the construction of roads and railways in that part of the colony. 
This claim is evidenced in some of the colonial policies such as the introduction of 
compulsory recruitment laws, which required Northern chiefs to recruit their own subjects 
mainly for underground mining activities in the South, and punished ‘recalcitrant’ chiefs 
who flouted recruitment processes (Plange, 1979; Kimble, 1963). Other policies such as 
the introduction of herd tax as well the less government investment and educational 
opportunities in the North made “Northners” to voluntary move to the South in search of 
paid jobs, particularly in the cocoa sector and mining industry (Abdullah, 2012, p. 80). It 
is estimated by Kimble (1963) that by 1917, an annual supply of about 15,000 Northern 
labourers to the South had been established (p, 42). Thus, as these policies reduced the 
North to a pool of cheap labour, northern labour played a pivotal role in the development 
of the South while their impact on the North was overwhelmingly negative. One reason 
was that the conscription of able-bodied men undermined the productive capacity of 





Moreover, in view of the perception that migrants would leave  the mines and the 
cocoa farms  if they made impressive savings quickly or would send monies homes, 
wages for northern labourers were purposefully designed to keep them on a bare 
subsistence account, hardly making it feasible for meaningful remittances for productive 
investments back home (Plange, 1979, p674). Also, the North’s function as a pool of 
reserve labour served to discourage the need for productive investments in the region. 
Drawing evidence from the Ghana National Archives, Plange (1976) made reference to 
one Colonial Secretary to have cautioned that “those interested in the planting of cotton 
[in the NTs] have also to contend in the colony with labour competition of the mines” 
(148). This argument corroborates Sutton’s (1989) argument that the availability of 
northern labour for the southern export economy “was considered whenever northern 
agricultural schemes were proposed” (p. 656). Thus, the need for northern labour in the 
South partly explains why the North was underdeveloped by the colonial government.    
Another way that the North was underdeveloped was its exclusion from the 
colonial educational policies. European-style education was introduced in the North very 
late, such that while the first secondary school in the Gold Coast was established in 1876, 
the North had their first government secondary school only in 1951 (Quist, 2003, p.188). 
It is important to state that during the early colonial era, educational development in Gold 
Coast was mainly carried out by the Christian missionary (Abdullah, 2012, p 81).  
However, the Christian missions’ contribution to the advancement of education in 
Gold Coast was mainly felt in the South as colonial powers initially prevented and 





(Kimble, 1963, p79). Table 2.2 below shows the educational disparities between the 
North and the South. From the table, the area identified as the colony and Ashanti, which 
is referred to as the South, had more school and more of their population enrolled in 
school compared to the North. 
Table 2.1 Official Statistics on Schools in the Gold Coast in 1919 
 
Source; Kimble 1963  
 
In spite of the fact that the exclusion of the North from colonial educational 
policies limited the chances of the North to develop, it is also important to emphasise here 
that this educational exclusion played a pivotal role in sustaining the North’s peripheral 





Addressing North-South Regional Inequalities? Socio-Economic Policies 
undertaken by Post-Colonial Regimes. 
 
In this section of the thesis we will examine socio-economic strategies adopted by 
various post-colonial governments after independence in 1957 to the year 2000, the 
period before the implementation of the PRSP and its associated enhanced HIPC 
initiative. This is done in order to determine how these policies impacted the country’s 





way or the other expressed commitment to bridge the disparity that exists between these 
regions. Most of the discussion in this section will focus on the Nkrumah-CPP regime 
(1951-1966) during which a number of structural shifts led to the adoption of certain 
measures that greatly influenced  the character of Ghanaian development policies from 
the time of independence through to the period of the introduction of economic reforms 
polices in the early 1980s . Outside of Nkrumah, the era of General Acheampong (1972-
1979), and Jerry Rawlings (1981-2000) whose policies have had some notable 
implications for the North-South inequalities, both positive and negative are considered. 
These regimes are also considered for the discussion because of their  relatively longer 
period in governance as compared with other regimes whose tenure were marred with  
coup d'état after a short period  of governance. Apart from this reason, the period under 
Rawlings is particularly considered because of the implementation of the World Bank’s 
neoliberal policies under this regime.   
 
The Nkrumah era, 1951-1966 
During the early 1960s, the CPP government launched a Seven-Year Development 
Plan (1963-70) with particular emphasis on promoting the productive sectors of the 
economy. One important feature of this plan was its perceived desire to ensure equitable 
regional development. The Plan intended “to ensure that the rate of progress in the less 
favoured parts of the country is greater than the rate of progress in those sections which 
have hitherto been more favoured”, and was therefore to “pay special attention to the 





(Dickson, 1975, p.110). Yet, the strategies in the development plan were inadequate to 
ensure equitable regional development.  
First,  It is argued that  the plan placed a lot more emphasis on quick returns on 
investments, as industrial projects were to be “sited so as to make the maximum use of 
the infrastructure facilities that Ghana already built up at such great cost instead of being 
sited where this will necessitate more of such non-productive investment” (Ibid). This 
implied that most of the proposed industrial projects would be situated in the South as the 
North was denied of meaningful infrastructure under the colonialism government. This 
perhaps explained why the three cities chosen for the establishment of industrial 
complexes under Nkrumah (i.e. Accra-Tema, Secondi-Takoradi and Kumasi) were all 
concentrated in the South (Owusu, 1992, p. 63). Consequently, “the North continued to 
receive a minimal share of government resources.” (Ladouceur, 1979 p, 260).  
Second, the political manner in which the projects under the development plan 
were geographically distributed undermined the objective of reducing regional inequality 
that existed. For instance, although the North also benefited from a number of agro-
processing industries and the establishment of some large scale irrigation schemes (e.g. in 
Vea and Bontanga), the exclusion of  some parts of the North because of political reasons  
raises  questions if these projects were driven by any conscious effort aimed at bridging 
regional inequalities. Songsore and Denkabe (1995) argue that the distribution of 
development projects under Nkrumah tended to be concentrated in areas where electoral 
support for the ruling CPP was strong, such that even the few industrial establishments in 





stronghold throughout the Nkrumah era ( p.18) . Konings(1986) in a similar argument  
states that even the idea of boosting agricultural production in the northern savannah 
during Nkrumah’s era was far from a deliberate effort aimed at bridging the North-South 
inequalities. He argues that the entire project was rather principally aimed at providing 
cheap food to the growing urban population of southern Ghana; not least as rising food 
prices increasingly threatened the legitimacy of the regime during the early 1960s. Thus, 
despite the fact that the North received few development programmes that were 
inadequate to reduce the inequality that existed between the region and the South, those 
programmes had different objectives than speeding development in the North to catch up 
with the South.   
On the other hand, Nkrumah’s regime is widely credited for its contribution to 
redressing the colonial legacy of North-South educational inequalities (e.g. Smock, 1976). 
Notably, Nkrumah established a Northern Scholarship Scheme in 1961 which provided 
grants to people of the North at various levels of the educational system. These included 
grants targeted at deserving students to gain access to secondary education; special 
maintenance grants for all northern students entering University; and the payment of 
boarding fees for secondary school students (Songsore and Denkabe, 1995, p.65).  
However, beyond the broader subsidization of northern education, it has been 
observed that similar to the spatial patterns of industrial establishments noted above, most 
of Nkrumah’s social sector public spending excluded the Upper West where there was 
strong opposition to  his government  (Ibid, P,17). Also, besides the fact that the 





existed in terms of school provision between the North and South was not adequately 
addressed during this era (see Abdullah 2012).  Thus, in spite of the CCP government 
being credited for contributing to the development of the North, particularly advancing 
education in the region, their efforts could not correct the perennial disparities in 
development that  existed between the North and South. . 
 
 
The Acheampong regime 1972- 1978 
The Acheampong government is one of the very few governments noted to have 
“had a positive vision for the development of the North” (Shepherdet al., 2004, p.13) in 
post independence Ghana, as the region benefitted from the regime’s extensive promotion 
of  rice farming. Through extensive state subsidies under this regime, Ghana did not only 
attain self sufficiency in rice production in the mid-1970s, but was also involved in the 
exportation of  significant quantities to neighbouring countries, much of which came from 
the North (Khor, 2006). The success attained in rice production in the 1970s was so 
important that it was the only minor crop that had experience significant growth at the 
time the performance of the entire agricultural sector was so bad that it grew less rapidly 
than population, and this has been explained as partly being  as a result of “privileged 
access to highly subsidized inputs, including fertilizer and tractor services” (World Bank, 
1995, P 70).  Cotton production also received enormous state support, and by 1976/77, 
the Ghana Cotton Board had sponsored over 38,000 farmers in cotton production, nearly 
all from the North (Shepherd, 1981).  
But contrary to perceiving that these initiatives would bring development to the 





and South, there is hardly any evidence to point to a significant closure of the North-
South divide during the 1970s. For instance, Ewusi’s (1976) utilising a wide range of 
socioeconomic indicators for a seminal work found that not only were the Northern and 
Upper regions the least developed regions in the mid-1970s, but also that these regions 
had equivalent to only 11 per cent and 7 percent respectively of the level of development 
found in Greater Accra . 
 Similarly, Dickson (1977) using nine different parameters to assess the levels of 
development of the various regions concluded that the Northern and Upper regions were 
by every index the least developed parts of the Ghana (P, 106). Moreover, the country’s 
economy in 1970s declined so low that the average growth rate for the period was -0.3 
percent (Whitfield, 2009, p. 21) which implies that it would have been extremely difficult 
for the North to have experienced any significant development. Unsurprisingly, it is noted 
that the economic decline in the 70s resulted in a significant drop in government’s  
provision of social services across the country, in ways that further resulted in regressions 
from earlier achievements in northern education during the 1960s (Songsore et al., 2001). 
Abdullah (2012) notes that by early 1980s the Northern Scholarship Scheme, which 
comprised three components mentioned above, had been reduced to only one component, 
the payment of boarding fees at the secondary school level. 
As a result of the limited development in the North during the 1970s, it is 
justifiable for one to argue that the development initiatives that were geared toward the 
North during this period were not adequate for bridging the inequalities that existed 





massive agricultural investment programmes in the North were carried out without the 
development of the North in mind per se but primarily meant to address Ghana’s rising 
food imports and its resultant depletion of foreign exchange reserves (Konings, 1984). 
Consequently, significant benefits of the northern rice boom eluded the poor farming 
households but went to those who were tied to the centres of political power such as 
senior public servants and army officers, some of them from the South                            
(Aryeetey, 1985; Abdullah, 2012, p 98).  
Nonetheless, the benefits of the improved local rice industry to the North cannot 
be entirely overlooked albeit their less impact on the region’s development. For example, 
for the first time an integrated regional labour market emerged in the region (Shepherd et 
al., 2004), with some pointing to a significant decline in the North-South migration and a 
rapid urbanisation of the Northern regional capital (Tamale) as signs of progress arising 
mainly from rice production(Konings, 1984, p. 104; Songsore, 2009, p. 15). 
 
 
Rawlings and the era of structural adjustment, 1981-1992 
As a result of the economic collapse in 1970s, the PNDC regime under JJ 
Rawlings launched an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983, followed by the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) from 1986 to 1991 with support from the IMF 
and World Bank (Aryeetey and McKay, 2007, p. 147). This economic liberalisation in the 
1980s and political liberalisation is said to have contributed to a fairly decent growth 
performance in the country (Booth et al., 2005, p 13). However, the relationship between 
economic growth and the most important social concern, poverty, was unclear as there 





Aryee,  2003). Nonetheless, restoring economic growth and macroeconomic stability 
could not have been devoid of any benefit at all, there was a fairly reasonable reduction in 
income poverty ( Aryeetey and Kanbur , 2005, p 2). However, with the rising tide unable 
to lift all boats, this benefit was unevenly spread across regions. Ghana’s ERPs/SAPs 
were predicated on restoring economic growth through a rehabilitation of the export 
economy, and the result was that most of the public investments went to Ghana’s core 
industrial region, Greater Accra, as well as the cocoa, timber and mineral producing areas 
in the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Western regions. By contrast, the historically 
disadvantaged regions of northern Ghana, which have their economies dominated by the 
production of basic agricultural commodities, were largely excluded from public 
investments during most of the adjustment era (Konadu-Agyeman, 2000; Songsore, 1989; 
2003).    
Evidence shows that “the SAP favoured export-sector agriculture, mainly cocoa, 
which saw some benefits flowing to large farmers in the southern part of the country” 
(Mohan, 2002, p. 13). Schneider (1992) notes that as part of the SAPs policies to promote 
exports, producer price of cocoa paid to cocoa farmers between 1983 and 1987 was 
increased more than sevenfold, which benefitted the South because cocoa production is 
circumscribed to the South (p. 77). Moreover, the removal of subsidies under SAP further 
marginalised northern farmers, as the removal of agricultural subsidies on food crop 
farming, which was the main economic activity in the North, led to increased cost of 
farming which pushed out many northern farmers out of business (Mohan, 2002, p. 140). 





affected the North as the production of  cotton and shea nut, the two major cash crops 
produced in the North was reduced (MacKay et al., 2005). For instance, cotton production 
in Ghana reached a minimum of about 1500 tonnes in 1985 compared to an average of 
7000 tonnes in the late 1970s ( see FAOSTAT, 2010)   
However, unlike shea and cotton, cocoa was not completely liberalised in spite of 
donor insistence on a full liberalisation of the cocoa industry (see World Bank, 1995, p, 
64; African Development Bank, 2002, p18).  The government insisted in its Cocoa Sector 
Development Strategy that when it becomes necessary to liberalise the external market of 
cocoa, “Ghana must evolve its own strategy and be in the driver’s seat” (Abdullah, 2012, 
p. 100) such that the government offered and continues to do so even today a minimum 
guaranteed prices to cocoa farmers for their produce in ways that has contributed to 
poverty reduction among cocoa producers.   There have been varying accounts regarding 
the preferential  treatment given to the  cocoa industry as against the  rest of the 
agricultural sector under SAPs and many analysts have argued  emphasising the capacity 
of  cocoa in generating foreign exchange earnings and economic rents for ruling elites as 
the major reasons for such preference  (e.g. Williams, 2009; Whitfield, 2011 ). 
Liberalisation of the economy under the SAPs also opened the floodgates for cheap food 
imports notably rice which contributed to the collapse of local rice production which had 
begun to flourish in the North during the 1970s.  
The implementation SAPs in Ghana also brought about reduction in government’s 
expenditure in the provision of social services through the introduction of cost recovery 





government. For instance,  Konadu-Agyemang (2000) notes that government’s 
expenditure on social services that included health and education was less than 5 percent 
of national budget in the 1980s compared to the 1970s where expenditure for the health 
sector alone averaged between 7 to 10 percent of national budget (475).  The introduction 
of cuts in government’s expenditure on social services affected the North more than the 
South as the relatively high level poverty in the North  made the accessibility and 
affordability of  social services more difficult for “Northners”. It is  noted that the while 
the introduction of hospital user fees in 1985 led to drops in hospital and clinic attendance 
between 25 to 50 percent in southern regions, in the North it was between 45 to 80 
percent (ibid, 480). Also, UNDP and ISSER (1997) notes that although under the SAPs 
there were significant declines in both school and hospital attendance across the country, 
the impact was “particularly” felt “in the northern savannah where the rise in the share of 
costs borne by the households seriously eroded the capacity of subsistence croppers and 
pastoralists to access quality education for their children” (p. 33).  
There is some evidence to also argue that under  SAPs, the North was 
disproportionately impacted negatively not only because of the liberalisation  of the 
economy and introduction of cost recovery to social services but also because of the 
relative exclusion of the North from public spending during this period. Abdullah  (2012)  
states that from 1986, the government of Ghana began to prepare a three year rolling 
Public Investment Programmes (PIPs) as part of the ERP/SAPs,and this was designed to 
give adequate consideration  to the regional distribution of projects to ensure equitable 





1994 shows that the rhetoric on equitable regional development was not translated into 
action (p, 103). For example, an evaluation of the educational sector shows that although 
the North comprised of 19% of country’s population then, it received only 11.6% of 
actual PIP expenditure. Besides, the scholarship provided to “Northners” under 
Nkrumah’s government during this period was in shambles as only one component of the 
scholarship package was implemented. An evaluation of the health sector also shows a 
similar result that investment in North was less compared to the South (ibid, p, 104).  
To be fair, however, the period of adjustment also saw some major infrastructural 
investment projects in the North, most notably the extension of the national electricity 
grid to the region and the rehabilitation of some North-South roads (Langer, 2009). Yet, it 
should be noted that the positive impact of these projects were also generally limited 
when analysed within the context of: (i) the massive investments in the infrastructural 
base of the southern export economy (Aryeetey-Attoh & Chatterjee, 1988); (ii) and the 
general neglect of the main cash crops in the region under SAPs (i.e. shea and cotton) as 
well as the staple crop sector – a sector upon which most farm households in the North 
depend. 
The historical accounts of Ghana’s North-South inequalities from these selected 
regimes show clearly that although the underdevelopment of the North stems from 
colonial government, it has been reinforced by post independent government.  
Development policies taken by these post-colonial governments over the years have 





socioeconomic conditions . The policies accentuated the North – South inequality largely 






















Chapter 3: PRSP and HIPC Initiative Implementation and Outcomes                          
Chapter two provided a brief history of Ghana’s regional inequality highlighting 
various development policies undertaken by various political regimes and their 
implication on regional development in Ghana .In chapter two, it was concluded that even 
though Ghana’s North-South inequalities have their origin in the colonial era, the 
inequalities were accentuated by post independent regimes.  In this chapter however, we 
will focus on only the Poverty Reduction Programmes; the PRSPs and the HIPC initiative 
and how they have impacted Ghana’s regional development from 2000 to 2013. We will 
focus on some of the key programmes and policies taken under Ghana’s PRSPs such as 
private sector development, export promotion, and the distribution of HIPC initiative fund 
and their impact on Ghana’s regional inequality. Furthermore, we will also use the 
regional distribution of poverty levels as well as regional performance of the MDGs since 
the implementation of Ghana’s PRSP and HIPC Initiative to analyse how these 
programmes have impacted regional inequality in Ghana.  
 It will be revealed that these policies and programmes did not reduce the 
differences in poverty level between the North and the South as these programmes did 
little to improve the socio-economic conditions of the poor in the North. Rather, these 
policies benefited the South and further widened the extant inequalities between these two 
regions. First, it will be shown in this chapter that the promotion of export and private 
sector development contributed to increasing the North –South  inequalities in the country 
in at least  these  two ways : (i) the promotion of private sector development, which has 





the already developed southern regions where there are higher returns on investment  and  
neglected  the poorer North where there are relatively less favourable factors to support  
the private sector .(ii) the promotion of exports policies which has favoured the country’s   
tradable sector, especially  the cocoa sector which is solely in the South, and this  in turn 
has  had a large impact on poverty reduction in the South, particularly rural communities 
in the South where cocoa is produced .  
Second, in this chapter, it will also be shown that the HIPC resources meant for 
poverty reduction projects and programmes in the country were distributed in a manner 
that favoured the South at the expense of the North. Through an analysis of the 
distribution of HIPC resources, it will also be revealed how the presence of neo-
patrimonial practices in Ghanaian politics and donor interest in Ghana’s Poverty 
Reduction Programmes (PRPs) featured in the inequitable distribution of the HIPC fund.  
 
PRSP Implementation in Ghana (2001-2009) 
The government of Ghana applied for debt relief under HIPC initiative in 2002, 
and as part of the aid conditionalities, Ghana was required to formulate a PRSP. The 
government of Ghana (GoG) prepared and implemented its first PRSP, the Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I), from 2003 to 2005, followed by the Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) from 2006 to 2009. Both GPRS I and II placed 
emphasis on ensuring sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction as well as 
addressing issues of exclusion, which included improving the development conditions of 
the three excluded northern regions as a main objective (GPRS I, 2003, p. 30; GPRS II, 





identified and the major ones included private sector development and export promotion. 
Private sector development in particular was given significant priority in the country’s 
PRSPs, especially the GPRS I which noted the private sector as the engine of Ghana’s 
economy, hence significant government efforts were directed towards its development     
( Whitfield , 2009,p.  20). 
 
 
a. Formal private sector-led investments 
The private sector has been touted for its importance in capital formation and job creation 
which is stated to “offer the best route out of poverty” (Turok, 2011, p. 83).   Ghana’s  
PRSPs, the GPRS I & II, which have a neoliberal bias,  place  great emphasis on the 
private sector  as the engine of investment and employment growth (GoG, 2005, p.22). As 
a result, under the GPRS I & II, private sector development was highly encouraged such 
that the government announced in 2001 that “a clear aggressive program of divestiture 
reform will be pursued, which will limit the role of government in the economy and 
reinforce the private sector” (MOFEP 2001, p. 326). Pursuant to achieving this goal, 
some measures were implemented to reduce the cost of formal private sector production 
such as a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 30 percent for companies 
listed on the stock market. Also, in 2003, a ministry was created to promote private sector 
development, and within the ministry, the government established an Institutional and 
Legal Reform Division to reduce bottlenecks to private sector development (GoG, 2005, 
p. 29). Indeed, these policy measures, among others, yielded positive results as the formal 





sector investment projects which exclude investments in mining, petroleum, stock 
exchange and projects in the free zones area of Ghana – all concentrated in the South, 
were registered with the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC 2007). This 
development in the private sector as would be expected came along with jobs creation 
such that between 2001 and 2010, the private sector provided over 238,334 formal jobs 
which were mostly located in the South (Obeng-Odoom, 2012, p. 97).   
However, it is also worth knowing that between 2001 to March 2007, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) component of the investments constituted 82.8 percent of the 
total, and the rest was partly a foreign-Ghanaian joint venture (GIPC 2007, p. 6). This 
dominance of foreign investment in Ghana’s private sector is an indication of how 
neoliberal policies of liberalisation and openness to the global capitalist market serve the 
neoliberal agenda of internationalising developing economies to favour Western 
multinational corporations. However, what is most important to this study is the notable 
spatial arrangement of these investments in the country. The majority of these private 
sector projects were mainly concentrated in the South, particularly the capital Accra, 
where greater scale economies can be obtained. Table 3.1 below shows that most of these 
private sector investment projects, about 98.8 percent were located in the already 
developed southern regions especially Greater Accra Region while the remaining  1.2 
percent in the lagging North. Between 2001 and 2007, only one investment project was 
located in the Upper West region and three in Upper East where poverty is most 
prevalent. Thus, the pro market stance of Ghana’s PRSPs, which is the promotion of the 





The concentration of these investment in the South echoes Myrdal’s theory of cumulative 
causation, which states that in regional development once a centre or region moves ahead 
of others, it will continue to grow due to its attraction of new socioeconomic investments 
and people (Myrdal 1957).  
Table 3.1 Registered projects by sectors, Jan. 2001-Dec. 
2007  
Source GIPC 2007 and GLSS 5 
From table 3.1 above, about 98.8 percent of all private sector investment registered from 2001 to 2007   
which even excludes investments in mining, petroleum, stock exchange and projects in the free zones 







Given the importance of the private sector in providing employment and 
subsequently reducing poverty, it would have been expected that government policies 
aiming at reducing the North –South inequality would target improving the investment 
climate in the lagging North in order to attract private sector and a possible growth in 
those regions. Yet, there is some evidence to suggest that the GPRS I &II placed rather 
too little emphasis on improving the investment climate to attract private sector and 
growth in the North as a whole.  
Although, there are several examples to back this claim that not much was done to 
improve private sector development in the North in the PRSPs, we will discuss only two 
of them.  First, the exclusion of the northern regions from the Presidential Special 
Initiative programme (PSIs). These initiatives were launched in 2001 and became part of 
the GPRS as part of strategies to reduce poverty, by promoting the private sector through 
creating enabling environments for private sector operators (NDPC, 2004, p.155). The 
PSIs were actually state-driven productive sector investments and were designed to create 
new pillars of growth for the economy; generate mass employment for the rural poor; and 
expand the export revenue base of the state (World Bank, 2007).  Although the PSIs were 
government investment initiative to support the private sector, the implementations of the 
PSIs were influenced by the desire to gain quick returns on investments. As a result the 
PSIs  targeting four areas: cassava starch, garments and textiles, salt and palm oil– all 
concentrated in the South which were all identified to have the potential of earning more 
foreign exchange revenue for Ghana. For instance it was stated by the  Minister of Trade 





news, 16-07-2014). Consequently, substantial public investments were made into each of 
these initiatives. For example, under the Cassava PSIs, the government set up a new 
cassava starch processing plant, the Ayensu Starch Company, in the Central Region at a 
cost of US$7 million (UNCTAD, 2011, p. 84). In contrast, although a PSI on a northern 
crop like cotton was later announced in 2003, very “little” or “nothing” was done in terms 
of its actual implementation such that the poorer northern regions did not benefit from the 
PSIs in any significant way (Songsore, 2011, p. 264).  
Second, is the distribution of Millennium Challenge Accounts (MCA), which was 
a $547 million dollars grant from the US government-“the single largest bilateral grant in 
Ghana’s history” (Ouma et al, 2012, p. 4). The MCA is a tool for international 
development assistance created by the US government in 2002 to reward developing 
countries that performed well in terms of governance (Booth, 2005, p. 9). Like many 
other aid  given to developing countries that implemented the PRSPs, the main goal for 
the MCA was to ensure poverty reduction, and it was anticipated to lift  some 1 million 
people out of poverty during its first 10 years of implementation (GoG, 2005b, p. 16). To 
achieve the purpose of poverty reduction in the country, the utilisation of the MCA 
resources was guided by three technical criteria: (i) degree of rural poverty ;(ii) proven 
success in private sector investments;( iii) agricultural growth potential (Abdullah, 2012, 
p.191). However, greater emphasis was placed on the availability of relevant private 
sector investments in the regions upon which MCA investments could build (ibid p 190).  
As a result, the distribution of the MCA fund fully excluded the two poorest regions in 





sector projects from 2001 to 2007 (see Table 3.1). Thus, the concentration of these 
productive investments from both public and private sector in the already developed 
southern Ghana is an evidence that neoliberal market-oriented policies create a pro 
market economy, where the market mainly determines and influences the allocation 
resources  to regions where there is higher returns on investment.  
  
 
b. Export Promotion  and Trade Liberalisation Policies:  Impact on North-South Inequality  
There has been a rich literature on the relationship between exports and trade 
liberalisation, growth and poverty reduction, which supports neo-liberal policies 
(Hoekman et al. 2004). However, the potential of export and its impact on spatial 
inequality has been an area with relatively less attention .In this section of the chapter, we 
will provide some evidence using cocoa from the South and cotton from North to show 
how exports and trade liberalisation policies under the GPRS contributed to accentuating 
the already existing North- South inequality. In this in section, we use these two crops for 
the analysis because of the importance of agricultural exports in reducing poverty in 
Ghana and also the fact that these two crops are the major cash crops in these two main 
regions.  
Ghana’s economy is noted to be dominated by the agriculture sector, particularly 
export agriculture in terms of its contribution to output, employment, revenue, and 
foreign exchange earnings. The cocoa sector alone contributes about 45 percent of the 
country’s foreign exchange earnings and a major source of employment in rural parts of 





agriculture play in the development of the country. Unsurprisingly, Ghana’s success in 
poverty reduction in the past decade has been in part attributed to the  increase in exports 
of crops like cocoa, palm oil and other agricultural exports” (ODI, 2005, p. 8). 
 As expected, Ghana’s PRSPs, which have a neoliberal bias, espoused trade 
liberalisation and the promotion of export. The country’s PRSPs place emphasis on 
export growth as the  pillar in ensuring  increase in economic growth and poverty 
reduction,   particularly GPRS II which is an agriculture-led strategy which seeks to 
diversify the economy’s structure away from dependence on cocoa to cereals and other 
cash crops for export markets( Whitfield, 2009, P 22) .However, having had the country’s  
major exports (cocoa, timber, gold, bauxite and other mineral ) since colonial era being 
produced  from the South, diversifying the country’s agriculture export base as proposed 
by the GPRS and renewing focus on  other major cash crops  specifically cotton and shea 
nut; the  major crops in the North, would have been instrumental in reducing poverty in 
the area. 
 However, the implementation of the PRSPs varied significantly from what had 
been suggested in the PRSPs. The WTO agreements ingrained in the  neoliberal policies 
package imposed on Ghana through the  conditionalities  in the PRS process  affected  
some of Ghana’s  export commodities particularly cotton production. Specifically, the 
Agriculture Agreement Ghana is subscribed to, allows OECD countries to maintain high 
protection for their local producers while also supporting them with large subsidies for 
them to produce cheaply at the world market making it difficult for developing countries 





dispute mechanism about US subsidies, contending that from 1992 to 2003, the United 
States had doubled subsidies to its cotton farmers. This, it was argued had depressed 
world prices and was  injurious to cotton growers in Brazil and many developing 
countries  while significantly increasing the US share of the  global cotton market (Gilson 
et al 2004, p. 21). Similarly, at the Cancún Ministerial meeting of WTO in September 
2003,Burkina Faso , on behalf of Benin, Mali and Chad, submitted a proposal requesting 
that all developing countries be offered financial compensation to offset the income they 
are losing as a result of the subsidies that cotton growers in developed countries received 
from their government (ibid).This unfair trade within the cotton industry has  affected 
cotton production in many developing countries including  Ghana, particularly the North 
where it is widely cultivated . The low market price of cotton which is even “lower than 
the cost of production in Ghana” (Abbortt, 2013, p. 259) has thwarted efforts to revamp 
the cotton industry in Ghana. The low producer prices has deterred farmers from 
engaging in cotton cultivation and banks from supporting its production such that even 
the  agricultural bank  in Ghana (ADB) stopped   financing the cotton sector since 2000 
(Sherperd et al., 2005, p. 65). Thus, resulting in a continuous fall of cotton production in 
Ghana, particularly from the year 2000 when the agriculture bank’s support was 
terminated (see figure 3.1).  
Moreover, the polices which led to the unbridled   liberalisation of the cotton 
industry under the SAPs, are still being followed under the PRSPs such that  cotton sector  
does not have protective measures such as subsidies on agro-chemicals to farmers, and 





profit and farmers to be relatively secure. Figure 3.1 below shows that cotton production 
in Ghana from the 1999/2000 has reduced significantly from over 45,000 metric tonnes 
and has been within the range of 15,000 metric tonnes and 20,000 metric tonnes the years 
after up to 2007.Thus, given the importance of export crops in reducing poverty in Ghana, 
the reduction in cotton production which is the main cash crop in the North affected 
poverty reduction in the North. Indeed, a study by ODI (2005) notes that the low 
production of cotton in North in part accounts for low economic growth needed for 
poverty reduction in the North (p. 8, 11)   
Figure 3.1 Cotton Productions in Ghana from 1999 to 2007 
 
 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2010 
 
  On the contrary, the relatively high international price for cocoa price in the 2000s 
seems to have encouraged Ghana government to continue its focus on cocoa exports at 
the expense of the promotion of cotton and other cash crops from the North. The final 





agriculture placed undue emphasis on cocoa production” (NDPC, 2006, p. 73). Some of 
the innovative strategies deployed under the GPRS to support the cocoa industry were 
government increasing the producer price paid to cocoa farmers, free mass spraying of 
cocoa farms to control pest and diseases, improved feeder roads in cocoa growing areas 
and the payment of farmer bonuses bi-annually, among several others (Whitfield, 2009, p. 
25).  
Consequently, cocoa production in Ghana during the period of the GPRS   
followed a dramatic upward trend, reaching a historic 740,458 tons in the 2005/2006 
cocoa season (Figure 3.2). Thus, unsurprisingly, cocoa producing localities, namely the 
‘rural forest’ in the South, recorded faster poverty reduction than rural communities 



























Figure 3.2 Cocoa Productions in Ghana 1978/79- 2007/08 
 
Source Author based on COCOBOD’s data  
 
Moreover, it is important to note that Ghana’s major exports since colonial era 
have been cocoa, gold, and other minerals and timber are all products from the South 
while the North’s economy is dominated by the production of basic agricultural 
commodities for local consumption. Thus, in all likelihood, policies promoting exports 
would benefit the South more than the North as it happen under the SAPs (see Mohan, 








HIPC Distribution in Ghana (2002-2009) 
Ghana under the HIPC initiative expected total debt relief of some US$3.7 billion 
over a 20 year period, of which 20 percent was to be used for domestic debt servicing, 
while the remaining 80 percent was to be channelled into poverty-related programmes 
spelt out in the GPRS  (ADB, 2010, p. 17) . Accordingly, in the GPRS I, priority was 
given agriculture, health (including HIV/AIDS), education, housing and community 
amenities (including environmental sanitation), and production infrastructure sectors 
which were identified as sectors very crucial to poverty reduction in Ghana ( GoG, 2003, 
p.  vii).Thus, as clearly stated in the PRSP policy documents, the HIPC initiative was 
mainly for poverty reduction in the country.  In this section, what we are interested in is 
to examine the distribution of the HIPC resources in order to ascertain if the HIPC 
resources contributed to increasing or decreasing the North-South inequalities and we will 
use data from the GPRS Annual Progress Reports (APRs) and the SEND foundation that 
tracked implementation of the GPRS I and II. 
` As a matter of fact, reducing the country’s North-South inequalities was 
considered a major objective in the GPRS I. It was noted in the policy document that such 
inequalities have persisted in Ghana because “past policies for a more equitable 
distribution of resource investment have not been implemented” (GoG, 2003, p. 31). 
Hence, it was declared an urgent need for “positive action to redress gross imbalances in 
geographical distribution of resource investment” by ensuring that the poorer North 
benefit disproportionately (Ibid). Based on this, a provision of “extra per capita 





GPRS. This was to be achieved through an application of a weighted formula   in the 
regional distribution of public expenditure.  The formula stipulates that the three Northern 
regions were to receive, in per capita terms, four times that for Greater Accra and two 
times that for the six other regions of Southern Ghana. In essence, this meant that nearly 
half (48%) of resources meant for GPRS implementation was planned to be allocated to 
the North (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.2: GPRS weighting criteria based on the depth of deprivation  for regional 
resource distribution 
 
Source: GOG, 2003, P. 185 
However, the actual distribution of HIPC expenditures was significantly at variance with 
the policy directions of the GPRS I and rest of this section will prove this statement.  
Ghana started receiving HIPC debt relief in 2002, and by 2006, “actual HIPC 
spending stood at ¢6,812.2 billion,(approximately US $862 million using the 2002 bank 
of Ghana exchange rate of US $ 1= ¢7900),  of which ¢1,003.0 billion (US $127million)  
was allocated to domestic debt payment” (ADB, 2009, p. 63).It is also important to state 
here that  the  analysis of the amount of HIPC spending  in this section  does not cover the 
entire HIPC debt relief amount. The allocation of HIPC funds to the regions took the 





central government Ministries, Departments and Agencies for the implementation of 
specific programmes. However, our analysis mainly focuses on those released directly to 
the DAs for which regionally-disaggregated data is available and also projects and 
programmes financed with the HIPC resources for which regionally disaggregated data is 
available. Notwithstanding, this partial coverage does not in any way take away the 
validity of the conclusions to be drawn in this section. One reason being that apart from 
using data on the HIPC monies directly released to district assemblies in the various 
regions, some of the data on HIPC financed projects and programmes used in this study 
are from the government ministries particularly the ‘Ministries of Education and Health, 
which received the largest chunk of HIPC funds’ (Abdullah, 2012, p 170); it therefore 
adds more credence to the data used for the analysis in this section of chapter three. 
The first tranche of the HIPC fund that was directly disbursed to various district 
assemblies of the all the ten regions in 2002 was ¢ 117 billion. However, the distribution 
of the money varied not on the basis of levels of poverty as designed in the GPRS, rather 
according to the type of local government jurisdiction. That is, whether the local 
government is  a district , municipal or metropolitan, and with population distribution 
serving as the key determinant of how a local government authority is characterised in 
Ghana, this pattern of disbursement tended to favour the more populous regions such as 
Greater Accra and Ashanti. From Table 3.3 below, it can be seen that the metropolitan 
assemblies, which are all in the South, received the highest amount of the HIPC money 





except Tamale, which is in the North. Thus showing clearly that the 2002 distribution of 




Table 3.3: HIPC Fund Allocations to District Assemblies, 2002 
 
Source; National Development Planning Commission (2003, p 91) 
 
Other reviews tend to corroborate the findings of this study that the first tranche of 
the HIPC money distributed to the regions favoured the South. For instance, the first 
Annual Progress Report (APR) of the GPRS, which is a review of the GPRS, also 
acknowledges that “the first allocation of HIPC funds in 2002 did not conform to the 
outlook expressed in the GPRS”, and accordingly recommended the need for future HIPC 
expenditures “to target very poor districts that are identified as poverty endemic, if the 
poverty gap is to be bridged” (NDPC, 2003, P 95). 
It is however important to note that the actual implementation of the GPRS started 
in 2002 (NDPC, 2003, p. 1), but it was in February 2003 that the official GPRS policy 





local government authorities in all the regions, both under the official years of the GPRS I 
& II continued to ignore the regional variations in levels of poverty. 
During the official years of the GPRS I (2003-2005), disbursement of the HIPC 
expenditure to the regions continued to ignore the initial sharing formula stipulated in the    
GPRS I which intended to increase expenditure to the deprived North in order to reduce 
the   inequality between the North and South. Drawing on data from the GPRS Annual 
Progress Report, an amount of about ¢423.3 billion (approximately US $54million) of 
HIPC funds was disbursed directly to the various districts during this period (NDPC 
2003, 2004, 2005). Utilising the GPRS resource sharing formula noted in figure 3.2 
above, Abdullah (2012) noted that from 2003 to 2005 , the expected amount of money for 
the  three northern regions should have  been ¢139.6 billion (approximately US 
$17.7million using 2005 exchange rate) ( p. 171). However, they received ¢28.9 billion 
(US$3.6 million) while the South received the remaining ¢394.4 billion (US 
$49.9million) instead of an expected amount of  ¢283.7billion (US$ 35.9milion) (ibid). It 
was also noted that Greater Accra and Ashanti regions, which are the most populous as 
well as most developed regions, received far more than what was expected with  an 
excess of ¢64.6 billion (US $ 8.2 million) and ¢41.4 billion(US $5.2million) respectively 
(ibid). Thus, contrary to the GPRS promise of providing “extra per capita expenditures” 
to the northern regions, it was rather the relatively developed southern regions that 
actually received  the highest per capita HIPC spending  of ¢30,000 compared to the  
North which was ¢7, 000 (Abdullah ,2012, p. 173 ). Additionally, a study by SEND-





education, health, water and sanitation sector during 2002-2004, also came to the same 
conclusion that the North was marginalised in the distribution of HIPC resources during 
the period of GPRS I. It was noted that the 3 Northern regions, which are the poorest in 
the country, received only 17 percent of  the entire the projects financed from the HIPC 
funds from 2002 to 2004 (SEND Foundation 2006) .  
Under GPRS II (2006-2009) however, regional distribution of HIPC resources 
directly given to the district assemblies in the various regions was relatively more 
equitable as the allocation to the North was improved. Table 3.4 below shows that 
cumulative HIPC expenditures for the North had increased from less than 7 percent under 
the GPRS I (2003-2005) to over 20 percent during the period of 2006 toc2008. Yet, the 
improved allocations to the North during the period of the GPRS II still fell far short of 
what was envisaged in the GPRS I policy document. In spite of the fact that the 
percentage  of HIPC expenditure increased during the GPRS II, in absolute term it was 
smaller than  expenditure  under GPRS I. For instance, while the Northern region alone 
received slightly over ¢20billion during GPRS I, cumulative HIPC expenditures to the 
three Northern regions during GPRS II amounted to only about ¢16 billion (Abdullah, 
2012, p.174). Table 3.4 below shows how the North’s HIPC receipts in terms of 
percentages increased from less than 6 percent under the GPRS I to 20.3 percent under 
the GPRS II. Yet, even after  the North’s receipt  had been increased, it was still less than 
the South and as also noted above, the amount of HIPC money distributed under the 





distribution of the HIPC money to all the regions in Ghana both under the GPRS I and 
GPRS II benefited the South more than the North.  
Moreover, apart from the HIPC monies that were directly distributed to the 10 
regions through the district assembles , the National Development Planning Commission 
(NDPC)  also noted  that out of 2,303 HIPC-sponsored projects in the health, education, 
water and sanitation sectors in 2006, the combined share of the three Northern regions 
was only 23% (NDPC, 2007, p. 70). Thus, although there was an improvement of the 
share of the North in the regional allocation of HIPC expenditure during the GPRS II, it 
could hardly have been sufficient to offset the North’s marginalisation under GPRS I. 
Thus, given the background that substantial amount of the HIPC spending was directed 
into poverty alleviation programmes and projects, the unfair distribution pattern of the 
HIPC expenditure benefited the South contributing to the increasing development gap 























Table 3.4 Percentage Figures of HIPC Fund Directly Disbursed to the Regions  
                  Through the District Assemblies  
                    
Source; Abdullah 2012 
 
The inequitable distribution pattern of the HIPC resources, however, raises 
questions about the implicit theory that underlie the PRSPs, that the principle of national 
ownership which requires broad based national participation would strengthen domestic 
accountability and elicit governments’ commitment to more equitable forms of 
development. Critics have however, pointed to the possibility of such reforms to be 
undermined by informal institutions, notably the “neo-patrimonial practices inherent in 
national institutions” (Bwalya et al., 2004, p. 5). This is because clientelist politics may 
mean that the distribution of public goods is diverted from a need-based approach to one 





also point to the fact that the inequitable distribution of HIPC resources may have been 
influenced by neopatrimonial practices that underlie Ghanaian politics. 
 As noted above, the disbursement of the HIPC expenditure was distorted from its 
initial intent that was based on a need-based approach which would have benefited the 
North, but instead, it was based on spatial distribution of population which favoured the 
South, in spite of the fact that the need-based approach was repeatedly emphasised in the 
GPRS. We suspect that driven by the imperative of winning elections, the HIPC fund was 
tactically used to favour regions more densely populated and those with majority of 
supporters for the  then ruling government. 
 In what follows, we will show the political context within which the HIPC fund 
was distributed. Table 3.5 below shows that Ashanti Region which is the most populated 
region and the same time the region with the  largest supporters for the then ruling 
government received the largest HIPC fund, particularly during the period of the GPRS I 
when the distribution of the HIPC fund largely benefited the South . Greater Accra 
Region which is the second most populous region as well as the region which produced 
the second largest votes for the ruling government had the second largest HIPC receipts. 
The table on the other hand, shows a corresponding marginalisation of the regions that 
produced small votes for the ruling party or were the opposition’s electoral strongholds, 
namely Volta and the three northern regions. For instance, Volta Region and Northern 
Region in spite of their high population received small amount of the HIPC fund during 









Table 3.5 Regional HIPC Receipts and Ruling Government’s Support 
 
 
Source; Abdullah 2012 and GSS 2010 
In support of the above argument, Abdullah (2012) drawing evidence from the  
Ghana’s public expenditure in the health and educational sectors between 2002 to 2009 , 
concluded that government spending in these sectors favoured the country’s South more 
than the North. He noted that the regional distribution of expenditure in these two sectors 
was influenced by dominant political actors in the country then, who were mostly from 
the South to benefit their regions while the North, which had less influential political 





Abdullah 2012, 170-82). Also, Whitlefield  (2009 ) notes that public spending  in Ghana’s 
PRSPs, was done in a manner which was  politically expedient particularly for winning 
election and not necessarily in the long term  development interest of the country( P, 12, 13) . 
This unequal distribution of the country’s HIPC also evidences the point raised in 
this thesis that the HIPC initiative and PRSPs were mainly introduced to entrench the 
neoliberal agenda, and in what follows we will show it. Before Ghana implemented its 
PRSP, donors through a General Budget Support (GBS) set a performance assessment 
framework (PAF) matrix comprising a list of reform elements that the GoG was required 
to implement in order for donor monies to be released. Thus, these requirements served as 
triggers for the disbursement of donor funds including the HIPC grants (Whitfield 2009, 
p. 8).The  GBS performance-based triggers emphasised, among others, some fiscal and 
economic structural reforms and provision of social services with greater attention given 
to chronically deprived areas particularly the North (NDPC, 2004, p.154; Azeem et al., 
2006, p.22). It should be noted, however, that it was incumbent on GoG to prove  on 
annual basis that the GBS performance-based triggers were being met in order to receive 
further funding” (Woll, 2008, p.80). Failure to attain any of the performance triggers 
resulted in punishment from donors. For instance, in 2006 the government failed to meet 
two (out of sixty-seven) of the performance triggers that were related to Budget & Public 
Expenditure Management Systems, and this resulted in some $24 million of the 
performance payment being withheld by donors (Whitfield, 2009, p. 200; Lawson et al., 





However, in spite of the performance based triggers’ emphasis on greater 
provision of social services to the deprived North, donors did not insist on targeting HIPC 
resources to the poor northern regions or even punish GoG for going contrary to these 
provisions in the performance based triggers. This clearly explains that PRSPs have been 
less about ensuring a genuine poverty agenda, but rather ensuring the establishment of the 
neoliberal agenda in developing countries.  
 
                                                                         
Outcomes of the PRSP and HIPC Initiative: The MDGs as Indicators  
In this section of chapter three, we will reveal how the implementation of the 
PRSPs has widened the Ghana’s North-South inequality by assessing the regional 
performance in achieving the MDGs. As noted by Okolo (2002), the PRSP became the 
guiding policies for attaining MDGs; it was expected to roll out policies that will ensure 
the attainment of all the 8 Millennium Development Goals. Accordingly, Ghana, since 
September 2001 has mainstreamed all the 8 goals in its PRSPs and key public policy and 
strategy documents. Progress towards the attainment of the MDGs has been recorded 
since 2002 in Annual Progress Reports (APR) on the implementation of Ghana’s medium 
term development frameworks namely, the GPRS I, GPRS II, and the GSGDA. These 
reports have shown that Ghana has made significant progress in achieving many MDG 
targets (GoG and UNDP-Ghana, 2010). However, there is a strong regionalised character 
to this progress; the historically poorer northern regions of Ghana (i.e. the Northern, 
Upper East and Upper West) have benefited very little from this progress. In what 





is available to show how the North – South inequality is manifested in the country’s 
performance on the MDGs  
 
GOAL 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger  
In achieving the MDG 1, one of the targets set for this goal is halving poverty by 
2015.  Ghana has achieved this goal by reducing poverty from 51.7 percent in 1991 to 
24.5 in 2013 (GoG and UNDP, 2015). However, this gain is fraught with regional and 
location disparities. For instance, between 1991 and 2006 the decline in upper and 
extreme poverty incidences were unevenly distributed across North -South. Although, 
between 1998 and 2006, the three northern regions experienced reduction in poverty, 
poverty incidence still remained high and raises doubts about ability of these regions 
achieving the targets before the end date of 2015. For instance, as of 2006, all the three 
northern regions had target deficits of not less than 20 percent in moving out of the 
poverty line with the two Upper regions in the North showing a distance of over 30 
percentage points to reach the target, which is reducing poverty by half of the 1991 
poverty figures. On the other hand, all the remaining seven regions managed to reach the 
target of halving upper poverty incidence in 2006 ahead of time (see table 3.6 below).  
Although, recent rebasing of the poverty line in 2013, which changed the 
consumption basket for calculating the poverty line shows that the North performed quite 
well in reducing poverty, particularly Upper East reducing poverty by 29 percentage 
points and Upper West 17 percentage points between 2006 and 2013, ( GLSS 6, 2013, p. 
14 ) making a trend analysis from 1991 to show whether the three northern regions  have 





Nonetheless, the high level of poverty  in the northern regions  even after the 
rebasing, which is  more than  twice the national average, shows how the North has 
lagged behind over the years  in reducing poverty. Poverty gap ratio which measures the 
depth of poverty also shows that the North lags far behind the South with an average of 
45 percent compared to the national average of 33 percent ( GoG and UNDP, 2012, p.13). 
This high depth of poverty in the North implies that a considerable proportion of the poor 
in these areas are far away from escaping poverty, hence the likelihood of not attaining 
the MDG 1 before 2015.  
 
Table 3:6 Percentage Changes in Poverty Level from 1991 to 2013 
 
 







Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education 
An indicator for effective assessment of participation of children in the 
educational system towards the attainment of Goal 2 is the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) 
and Net Enrolment Ratio (NER). Ghana’s MDG progress report in 2010 shows that the in 
terms of both GER and NER, the country is on track in achieving Goal 2 with all the 
regions including the three northern regions (GoG and UNDP, 2010, p. 25). However, 
apart from using school enrolment as an indicator of assessing a country’s performance of 
achieving universal primary education, is the need to uphold quality of education. One of 
the proxies for measuring quality of education is the pupil to teacher ratio (PTR). A trend 
analysis of the PTR shows that although the North has performed creditably well from 
47.9 in 2003 to 41.4 in 2010, it still lags behind the national average 29.1 in 2010.   
Table 3.7 Trend in Pupil-Teacher Ratio (Primary Schools) 
Regions  2003 2010 2015  Target 
Northern Region 38.6 28.7 na 
Upper East 58.9 39.3 na 
Upper West  46.2 36.2 na 
Average (three northern 
regions  
47.9 34.6 na 
National Average  34.9 29.1 35 
Source: GLSS 6   
 
Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and empowerment of women 
Ghana’s performance in Goal 3 is best described as one with mixed results as 
some targets set for this goal have been achieved and others far from being achieved.  
One of such targets is to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education. 
All regions in the country including the three northern regions are noted to achieve gender 





Using Gender Parity Index (GPI) which measures the ratio of boys to girls’ enrolment, all 
the regions in the country have attained more than 90 percent as of 2010 with the two 
Upper Regions even attaining 100 percent (GoG and UNDP, 2010, P, 28-29). 
 However, other indicators of gender equality such as women in non agriculture 
paid jobs and women in government show Ghana’s poor performance of achieving gender 
equality in productive employment and government. For instance, the share of women in 
wage employment was 25.4 percent and women in parliament as well as women 
appointee by government were 8.3percent  and 7 percent respectively in 2009  (GoG and 
UNDP, 2015, p36). However, a regional analysis shows that the three northern regions 
had the worst women representation in government. For instance, from 2008 to 2012, all 
the three northern regions had one woman each in parliament, while the Greater Accra 
and Central regions had eight and five women MPs respectively, with four MPs each for 
the Ashanti and Volta regions (Ibid 37). Other evidence shows that women from the 
North are the most vulnerable in the country in terms of female employment as many of 
them move to the South to engage in work such as carrying of heavy load for a living 
because of limited opportunities for wage employment in the North ( see Awumbila,  
2006).   
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality 
Ghana has made considerable gain improving children health by reducing Under-5 
mortality rate from 122 per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 82 per 1,000 live births in 2012 
and infant mortality from 57 to 53 per 1,000 live births between 1994 and 2012. ( GoG  
and UNDP 2015, P 39). Yet, using the GLSS 6 data in 2013, it is still considered unlikely 





on child mortality, there seems to be inadequate data for regional comparison. However, 
some inference can be drawn using poverty data because in Ghana child mortality is 
noted to have some degree of relationship with poverty (see GLSS 6, 2014). In Ghana, it 
is estimated that Under-5 mortality is higher among those in the lowest quintile and this 
has remained consistent since 2003 such that an estimated ratio of 106 deaths per 1,000 
live births was reported among households in the lowest quintile compared to 52 deaths 
per 1,000 live births among those in the highest quintile. Similarly, the highest infant 
mortality rate of 61 deaths per 1,000 live births was reported among those in the lowest 
quintile as against 38 deaths per 1,000 births among those in the highest quintile in 2012 ( 
GoG and UNDP 2015, P ,14).  Deducing from this data, it can be rightly said that child 
mortality is high and has remained consistent in the North where poverty is high and a 
significant proportion of its population are in the lowest quintile.  
 
Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health 
The major target for this goal is to reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 
2015, the maternal mortality ratio. However, achieving this target has been a major 
challenge for the country and predicted to be one that would likely be missed by the end 
date of the MDGs. From 1990 to 2010, spanning a period of 20 years, records of  
maternal mortality ratio  from health institutions  (IMMR) indicate only 24.1 per cent 
reduction in maternal deaths in the country, showing one of the slowest progresses among 
all the MDG targets ( GoG and UNDP,2012, p. 37).  This poor performance has been 
largely attributed   to low supervised delivery by skill professionals which is a key factor 





spite of general low supervised delivery in the country, a significant equity gap exists 
across regions with the three northern regions consistently getting less than 50 percent of 
all child birth supervised by skill professionals compared to the South whose average has 
been over 50 percent. Table 3.9 shows the disparity that has existed between the North 












2008 2003 1998 
Northern 27.2 11.4 11.1 
Upper West 46.1 16.8 16.8 
Upper East  46.7 22.5 19.1 
Volta 53.7 36 34.4 
Central 54 40.3 44.8 
Eastern 60.8 48.1 47.3 
Western 61.7 44.8 44.6 






Greater Accra 84.3 73.5 72.5 
Source: GDHS, 1998, 2003 and 2008 
 
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases 
The target for this goal in Ghana is to ensure that the spread of HIV AIDS  is 
halted and reversed by 2015 and also reverse the incidence of malaria and other major 
diseases by 2015 (GoG and UNDP 2015, P52) . In the case of HIV AIDS, its prevalence 





towns, and towns along borders and main transportation routes (GAC, 2015, p. 34). A 
regional analysis of HIV prevalence shows that HIV AIDS is highly concentrated in the 
South, which has the most urban centres, and where all the mining towns are located. 
Figure 3.3 below  is a regional trend analysis of  HIV prevalence from 2010 to 2014, 
which shows that almost all the regions have been  experiencing  drop and increase in 
prevalence rate, but the three  Northern regions  have  relatively maintained low 
prevalence rate. 
 
Figure 3.3 Regional HIV Prevalence Rate 2010-2014 
                





Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability 
Ghana’s main target for this goal is to integrate the principles of sustainable 
development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental 
resources (GoG and UNDP 2015, p. 54). On the contrary, the loss of environment has 
been on the ascendency. For instance, between 1990 and 2010, Ghana lost an average of 
125,400 hectors of forest with the annual deforestation rate increasing from 1.5 percent in 
1990 to 2.4 percent in 2010(GoG and UNDP 2013, p. 50). 
 Although there seems to be inadequate regional data on deforestation, some 
scholars  have argued that the high levels of poverty in northern Ghana has been a major 
driving force in excessive  degradation of the region’s vegetation . Braimoh (2006) notes 
that  farming  and wood energy exploitation alone have contributed to 12% of the 
vegetation cover being converted from grass to cropland  and  pasture fields in the North 
(p. 1).  The excessive vegetation degradation in the North is evidenced  is by recent signs 
of desertification in the regions such as water stress, physical loss of soil nutrients, soil 
erosion, salinization and poor vegetation cover which has poverty implications  ( Adanu 
et al ,2013, P,68). 
Goal 8: Development a Global Partnership for Development 
The main objective for this goal is addressing the special needs of developing 
countries, and this requires developed countries to increase Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA) to developing countries to at least 0.7 percent of gross national income 
(GNI) by 2015. Although, some of the developed countries have reneged on their 
commitment to fulfill this promise, the amount of ODAs that Ghana has received in 





development process. For instance, in 2010, ODA alone contributed to 12.8 percent of the 
country’s GDP and from 2003 to 2013 the country has received approximately 17billion 
USD from ODA ( GoG and UNDP 2013, p. 63 ; GoG and UNDP 2015,p.  64)  
Although, there  is no actual regional  analysis of Ghana’s total ODA received ,  
evidence from  HIPC grant, a significant aid under the MDG project  shows that the 
South  benefited significantly  from it because  the regional distribution of the grant  was  
largely influenced by  population  and the number of urban areas in a region.  
 
Another objective for Goal 8 is to ensure that the benefits of new technologies, 
especially information and communications (ICT) are made available to Ghanaians. 
Although in recent times Ghana has is experiencing a technological revolution, which is 
changing the social fabric of the country, the spate of this happening has been spatially 
uneven. It is estimated that 47.7 percent of Ghanaians who are 12 years and older have 
mobile phones and about 7.7 percent of these persons have access to internet (GSS, 2012, 
P 83). However, only about 3.7 and 0.25 percent of  persons 12 years and older from the 
three Northern Region have mobile phones   and access to internet respectively (see 

























Figure 3.4 Regional Distribution of Mobile Phone and Internet Usage ( for persons 




Source:  GSS 2012  
 
          From the above, Ghana’s progress towards the MDGs seems to be quite impressive. 
However, in almost all the goals with the exception of Goal 6 which the North has 
performed relatively better than the South, the North has lagged far behind the South in 
nearly all the Goals, implying that Ghana’s  progress  with the MDGs cannot be attributed 
to the entire country. The unequal progress in attaining the various targets of the MDGs 





country’s North and South have failed. Thus, indicating need for particular policy 
attention in the three northern regions to address the development deficit in the region.                    
                                          


























Chapter 4: Conclusion and Recommendation   
The central objective of this thesis was to determine the extent to which Ghana’s 
PRSP was contributing to the reduction of   regional inequalities between  Ghana’s  
North-South in which the North has historically lagged far behind the South in terms of 
development, with emphasis on reducing differences in  poverty  levels between these 
two regions. The issue of the PRSP’s contribution to addressing inequitable regional 
development is timely because it is the current development policy meant to drive the 
Global South to development. It is even more important now  that the MDGs for which 
the PRSPs were the guiding policies have reached their sell-by date, yet concerns about  
growing inequalities including spatial inequalities  still remain a central issue in the 
development discourse as manifested in the new development goals , the SDGs (SDG10), 
which emphasizes on reducing spatial inequality.   
Throughout this thesis, the argument made is to demonstrate that Ghana’s PRSP 
and its associated HIPC initiative, despite the rhetoric of addressing the regional 
inequality that exists along the country’s North –South divide, and also the expectation 
that reducing regional inequalities in terms of differences in poverty level would 
inevitably be a part of an effective poverty reducing strategy has failed to do so. Rather, 
these development programmes have contributed to the increase in inequality between the 
country’s North and South, which is evidenced by the increasing incidence of poverty in 
the North and a reduction of poverty incidence in the South since their implementation.  
This thesis makes the argument that PRSP and the HIPC initiative’s framework, 





resulted in increasing Ghana’s North-South inequalities .First, poor implementation of the 
country’s  HIPC Fund led to  inequitable distribution of  the HIPC resources which 
favoured the South even though in the country’s PRSPs poverty document, it was 
suggested that the North would receive greater portion of the HIPC resources because of 
high incidence of poverty in the region .Second, the overall design of these development 
programmes were aimed at serving the neoliberal agenda of the IFIs hence the  
implementation of  neoliberal policies such as promoting export of primary goods and 
private sector development favoured the South. These policies favoured the South 
because majority of the country’s export s are found in this region and also because the 
“South enjoys more economies of scale than the North” (Aryeetey et al 2009, p13), hence 
it attracted more investment than the North    
Cocoa whose production is concentrated in the South was given preferential 
support under Ghana’s PRSPs which prioritises exports because of its profitability to 
country as the highest provider of foreign exchange for the country. As a result, cocoa 
production during the period of the PRSPs increased leading to significant poverty 
reduction in cocoa growing areas ( Whitfield 2009,p. 11) , while the North whose  
economy dominated by food crops consumed domestically was relatively  neglected. 
Even cotton, which is the main exports from the North, because of its less profitability 
was not supported under the country’s PRSPs. Lastly, the implementation of market 
related policies in the form of promoting   private sector development in the GPRS, 






 The impact of PRSPs and HIPC initiative on Ghana’s North –South inequality is 
also clearly evidenced by the outcomes of the MDGs, which are the ‘development targets 
that the HIPC initiative and PRSPs served as the guiding policies for their achievement’ 
(Okolo, 2015, p 8). The regions referred to as the North trailed behind the South in 
achieving almost all the MDGs, especially Goal 1 which focuses on reducing extreme 
poverty by half in 2015. While all the regions in the South achieved this goal in 2006, the 
North was far behind the achievement of this goal and even in some of its regions poverty 
had increased (GoG and UNDP, 2012, P13).   
All of these limitations can be linked to the arguments in the literature review 
which suggested that the PRSP and the HIPC initiative have not been effective in 
reducing regional inequality in Ghana because these policies were mainly designed to 
serve the neoliberal agenda of the IFIs of creating neoliberal capitalist global economy 
that favours multinational national companies and the global North. Hence, regions in 
poor countries which do not possess the resources that meet the need of the global North 
or by circumstance of their geographic conditions cannot directly join the global capitalist 
trade would be underdeveloped.   
In what follows, this concluding chapter will also highlight in detail how some of 
the  weaknesses in the PRSP and HIPC framework have made the PRSPs ineffective in 
addressing the regional inequality that exist in Ghana. First, the claim that the PRSPs are 
nationally owned policies was not proved at least in Ghana’s PRSPs. The fact that 
Ghana’s PRSPs focuses on promoting the Washington consensus model set of policies 





oriented policies such as private sector development just like many other countries that 
implemented the PRSPs raises questions about the true ownership of the country’s 
PRSPs.  
 Moreover, the theory of political change which underpins the PRS process that 
the principle of national ownership, which also emphasizes on broad based national 
participation embedded in the PRSP, would strengthen domestic accountability and elicit 
governments’ commitment to more equitable forms of development did not materialise in 
Ghana. The existence neo-patrimonial practices in Ghana’s politics which influenced the 
unequal distribution of HIPC resources to favor the South, shows that the theory of 
change that underpins the PRSPs is based on a mistaken identity of politics in most 
developing countries.    
In a like manner,  the neoclassical economic theory, which forms the bed rock of  
all World Bank and IMF neoliberal policies including the PRSPs postulates that  ‘spatial 
inequalities are  merely short-term aberrations that arise from structural factors, but are 
resolved in  the long term’ (Hirschmann 1958) , has been elusive in Ghana. It has been 
over three decades that Ghana has implemented economic reforms and market 
liberalization policies (both SAPs and PRSPs) , but yet to experience any  re-structuring  
of  spatial development patterns which  will address the country’s North –South 
inequality. What has happened is that the neoliberal policy regimes have favoured the 
country’s South, which has the resources that are tradable in global capitalist economy, 





  Moreover, the notion that these neoliberal market oriented policies will expedite 
national growth that will trickle down to reduce poverty under which reducing spatial 
dimensions of poverty is subsumed (World Bank, 2009), has so far not worked in Ghana. 
Evidence from this thesis shows that although Ghana has experienced impressive growth 
over the period that the PRSPs have been implemented, poverty reduction has been slow 
in northern Ghana and even increased in some parts of the region. Thus, this continuous 
growing disparity between the North and South debunks the convergence perspective of 
regional development that underpins the neoclassic economic theory, which argues that 
spatial inequality under free market policies will be resolved in the long run when 
equilibrium is reached.   
In all, findings from this thesis shows that the PRSP has failed to address the 
Ghana’s North –South inequality and has even widened the gap further. From a broader 
development perspective, under SAPs the country experienced similar regional 
development pattern (Brown et al, 2007, p. 20), this therefore suggests that development 
policies that are neoliberal in their approach have been ineffective in meeting the 
country’s regional development objective of bridging the development gap between the 
North and South. This Ghanaian experience therefore tends to debunk the orthodox 
economic theory which underpins the neoliberal ideology that market oriented policies 
resolve unequal regional development patterns in the long term. Indeed , literature 
actually abounds with evidence of the inability of the PRSP  and its associated  HIPC 
initiative to enhance inclusive and equitable development outcomes  in countries that 





stated by the IFIs to have been successful in reducing poverty such as Uganda and 
Bolivia, it has been  observed that there are  concerns about growing inequalities 







In this thesis, we make the argument that because the PRSPs are basically 
neoliberal in nature, they mostly benefit regions with resources and other conditions that 
serve the neoliberal agenda and neglect regions which lack these resources, thus leading 
to regional differences in development. However, this argument is based on the 
implementation of the PRSPs in Ghana, and there is need for further research in order to 
see whether and to what extent such arguments hold true in other developing countries 
with similar regional differences like Ghana. Nonetheless, the need to reform PRSPs’ 
framework cannot possibly be overemphasized particularly now that the new set of 
development goals-the SDGs, which place emphasis on addressing all forms of inequality 
including horizontal inequalities. Several suggestions for PRSP reforms have been put 
forward by different think tanks on PRSP effectiveness in reducing regional disparity in 
poverty. The conclusion drawn from this thesis basically emphasises the need for reforms 
of the PRS process beginning from its policy framework which should apply the 
appropriate principles leading to pro poor, inclusive and equitable development outcome. 





The need for countries’ PRSPs to look beyond the one-size fit all policies for 
addressing issues of unequal regional development, particularly in countries where there 
are significant regional or spatial differences in resources. This is because the one- size- 
fit -all neoliberal policies such as the promotion of export and free market seen in nearly 
all country PRSPs thrive in only regions with the resources and characteristics that 
support them as seen in the case of Ghana. In order to address unequal regional 
development in countries’ PRSPs, it is important for these policies to take into 
consideration the social, cultural, and institutional characteristics of places especially 
those that are least developed.  This approach will also require that country PRSPs 
include proper national consultative process to involve inhabitants of least developed or 
marginalised regions to ensure that their needs are addressed.   
Although, we suggest that a proper national consultative process may help in 
addressing inequitable development of places within countries, we admit this approach 
may not be adequate in many developing countries where politics of clientelism and neo 
patrimonial practices are prevalent. In view of this, we suggest that donors can also help 
in mitigating the effects of clientelsim and neo patrimonial practices on regional 
development processes in many aid dependent countries. Donors should make the 
reduction of regional inequality part of the objectives of their aid policies and also engage 
aid recipient countries in a dialogue on the need to address unequal regional development.  
This suggestion, however, does not in any means imply that reducing regional inequality 
should be made a condition in the PRS process as the PRSP package is already replete 





In addition, we also propose that countries should place more emphasis on growth 
that can be directly linked to the poor particularly those in marginalised areas and not 
growth policies that are based on the trickle-down approach.  Thus in Ghana for instance, 
where the North – South inequality results from limited economic activities in the North, 
there is the need for government to engage in productive investment that will enhance 
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